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16	SOUTHERN DISTR	ICT OF CALIFORNIA
17		
18	Al Otro Lado, Inc., <i>et al.</i> ,	Case No.: 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC
19	Plaintiffs,	PLAINTIFFS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR
20	V.	SUMMARY JUDGMENT
21	Chad F. Wolf, ¹ <i>et al.</i> ,	
22	Defendants.	Special Briefing Schedule Ordered (see Dkt. 518)
23		NO ORAL ARGUMENT UNLESS
24		REQUESTED BY THE COURT
25	¹ Defendants have represented that Mr	Wolf is the Acting Secretary of the US
26	Department of Homeland Security. Num	nerous courts disagree. Casa de Md., Inc. v.
27	2020 WL 5798269, at *7-9 (N.D. Cal. 20 2020 WL 5995206, at *24 (D.D.C. 2020)	Wolf is the Acting Secretary of the U.S. erous courts disagree. <i>Casa de Md., Inc. v.</i> . 2020); <i>Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr. v. Wolf</i> , 20); <i>N.W. Immigrant Rts. Project v. USCIS</i> ,).
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1	CITATION FORM
2	"CBP" refers to U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
3	"CM" refers to Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 563).
4	"CM Opp." refers to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for
5	Summary Judgment (Dkt. 585).
6	"CM Opp. Ex." refers to the exhibits attached to Plaintiffs' Opposition to
7	Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 585).
8	"DHS" refers to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
9	"Ex." refers to the exhibits attached to the Declaration of Stephen Medlock filed
10	concurrently with this reply brief.
11	"INA" refers to the Immigration and Nationality Act.
12	"OFO" refers to CBP's Office of Field Operations.
13	"Op. Br." refers to Plaintiffs' Opening Brief in Support of their Motion for
14	Summary Judgment (Dkt. 533).
15	"Op. Ex." refers to the exhibits attached to Plaintiffs' Opening Brief in Support of
16	their Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 533).
17	"POE" refers Class A ports of entry on the U.SMexico border.
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27	V REPLY IN SUPP. OF PLTFS' MOT S.J.
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I. **INTRODUCTION**

1

As a report issued this morning by DHS' Office of Inspector General ("OIG") 2 makes clear, Plaintiffs caught the Government red-handed. See Ex. 1. Unrebutted 3 evidence that OIG has now corroborated shows that when asylum seekers were in 4 the process of arriving at POEs, CBP officers lied to them. Under instructions from 5 their superiors, CBP officers told asylum seekers that POEs were "at capacity" when 6 those POEs were actually operating well below 100% capacity. Rule 30(b)(6) 7 witnesses admitted that these asylum seekers were attempting to enter the U.S. 8 Therefore, they should have been inspected and processed as the INA requires. 9

Defendants' turnback policy had the intent and effect of turning back asylum 10 seekers and denying them access to the asylum process. The Secretary of DHS 11 requested information on how many asylum seekers would be turned back at POEs 12 if a memorandum that memorializes certain aspects of the turnback policy were 13 implemented. After learning that 650 asylum seekers per day would be turned back, 14 she issued the memo. Ex. 1 at 6. 15

16	In addition,
17	
18	. The reason for this
19	decision is obvious. Defendants believed that processing asylum seekers more
20	efficiently would undermine the purpose of the turnback policy by creating a "pull
21	factor" that would cause more asylum seekers to arrive at POEs. As a result, they
22	
23	·
24	Defendants also admitted that their actions broke the law. In a flagrant
25	violation of the law, Defendants routinely turned back asylum seekers who were
26	standing on U.S. soil. And, behind closed doors, POE leadership told union officials
27	that all turnbacks broke the law. See Ex. 1 at 17 ("I know from what came down
28	from [CBP] HQ, we are trying to process the least amount of people.").
1	REPLY IN SUPP. OF

Amazingly, Defendants' primary response—that they simply made inspecting 1 2 and processing asylum seekers a lower priority—is itself a violation of law. Defendants repeatedly admitted that they were diminishing inspection and 3 processing of asylum seekers by making it a subordinate priority. 4

What is going on here is a shocking abuse of power by the Executive Branch 5 and abdication of Defendants' statutory and international law obligations. 6 Defendants claim that they alone have the discretion to decide when to inspect and 7 process an asylum seeker, and how many asylum seekers will be inspected and 8 processed. That is not true. In the INA and Homeland Security Act, Congress gave 9 10 Defendants specific instructions about when and how asylum seekers were to be inspected and processed and the level of priority that should be given to that mission. 11

The goal of the turnback policy is to end asylum. Defendants' core argument 12 is that, despite clear statutory language, they alone have the discretion to end asylum 13 as we know it by standing astride the border and blocking access to the U.S. and to 14 15 the asylum process no matter what other missions they have and no matter what the true facts are on the ground. Defendants argue that as long as POEs want to focus on 16 17 other missions, Defendants can process zero asylum seekers every day and this Court can do nothing about it. That is not, and never has been, what the law says. 18

Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on that basis alone. In this brief, 19 Plaintiffs address the remaining chaff in Defendants' opposition brief. First, the OIG 20 report is powerful evidence that Defendants broke the law. Second, Plaintiffs explain 21 why Defendants' cherry-picked factual recitation is wrong. Third, even if turnbacks 22 can be characterized as delay rather than denial of a mandatory duty, application of 23 the TRAC factors shows that delay is unreasonable. Finally, this Court can, and 24 should, enter declaratory and injunctive relief. 25

26

THE DHS OIG REPORT ENDS THIS CASE П.

27 This morning, DHS OIG issued a report that puts the lie to all of Defendants' factual arguments. In the blockbuster report, OIG concludes that "while DHS 28 REPLY IN SUPP. OF PLTFS' MOT S.J.

leadership urged asylum seekers to present themselves at [POEs], the agency took 1 deliberate steps to limit the number of undocumented aliens who could be processed 2 each day at the Southwest Border [POEs]." Ex. 1 at 10. According to the report, 3 Defendants "stopped the routine processing of ... asylum seekers ... at 7 of the 24" 4 POEs. Id. Asylum seekers that presented themselves for inspection at those POEs 5 were told to return to Mexico and were forced to walk miles through harsh terrain to 6 place themselves on a waitlist with hundreds of others. Id. at 12-13. Moreover, at 7 four POEs, CBP officers regularly turned back asylum seekers that had already 8 crossed the international border and entered the U.S. Id. at 15. Furthermore, using 9 the exact same methodology as Plaintiffs' expert, Stephanie Leutert, OIG concluded 10 that although increasing numbers of asylum seekers were waiting to be inspected 11 and processed in Mexico, POEs "were not using all available detention space." Id. 12 And OIG directly observed detention cells sitting empty while POEs were 13 continuing to turn back asylum seekers. Id. at 17. OIG also discounted DHS' 14 15 operational capacity excuse, stating "our evidence . . . indicates that [CBP] used these reasons regardless of the port's actual capacity and capability." Id. at 20. As 16 17 the OIG concludes: "The law does not set limits as to the number of asylum seekers the Government can or must process. Nevertheless, the [DHS] Secretary and CBP 18 have effectively limited access for undocumented aliens wishing to claim asylum in 19 20 the United States, sometimes without notice to the public." *Id.* at 19. This remarkable admission ends this case. Defendants' own Inspector General has confirmed all of 21 22 Plaintiffs' substantive factual arguments are true. Summary judgment should be issued in Plaintiffs' favor. 23

24

III. DEFENDANTS IGNORE FACTS THAT UNDERMINE THEIR CASE

Defendants mischaracterize the record in an effort to manufacture disputed facts where none exist. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there can be no *genuine* issue of *material* REPLY IN SUPP. OF

fact." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant 1 2 or unnecessary" do not count. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Plaintiffs have explained why every turnback is illegal regardless of the 3 excuse for it, Op. Br. at 18-25; CM Opp. at 1-4, and will not belabor that point here. 4 5 In addition, Defendants' attempt to excuse their conduct have no factual support. The record shows that (a) the decision to start turning back asylum seekers in 2016 6 was caused by media pressure, not the number of arriving noncitizens; (b) the 7 8 decision to expand metering had nothing to do with the number of noncitizens 9 arriving at Texas POEs; (c) turnbacks continued in 2017, when there were no capacity concerns at POEs; (d) Defendants' concerns about the April 2018 migrant 10 caravan were overblown; and (e) the turnback policy is costly and dangerous. 11


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
A. Defendants Ignore What Actually Occurred in May 2016

Defendants claim that their actions were justified because they were dealing 13 with a "sustained and overwhelming surge of undocumented" noncitizens, and that 14 15 by late May 2016 the San Ysidro POE simply could not hold any more noncitizens and started turning back asylum seekers. See CM at 1-3, 11. That is not true. In late 16 17 May 2016, CBP officials on the ground at the San Ysidro POE repeatedly explained the steps that they were taking to deal with an uptick in arriving noncitizens at the 18 port and their future plans for doing so. 19 . See, e.g., Op. Ex. 34 (20 21); Op. Ex. 39 (22); Op. Ex. 38 (23 24 Ex. 2 (25 26). However, on May 25,

27 2016, Pete Flores, the Director of Field Operations for OFO's San Diego Field
28 Office, told Todd Owen, then the Executive Assistant Commissioner of OFO, that REPLY IN SUPP. OF

PLTFS' MOT S.J.





PLTFS' MOT S.J.

1	factor," they repeatedly refused to implement plans to inspect and process asylum
2	seekers more efficiently. In November 2016,
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4	Op. Br. 9-11.
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6	Op. Ex. 3 at 69:12-70:2 (Hidalgo POE
7). Then, when the leadership of OFO's San Diego Field Office
8	
9	, DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen ordered
10	See, e.g., Op. Ex. 109 at 473-474; Op. Ex. 110; Op. Ex. 111.
11	Defendants' attempt to isolate and explain away these incidents makes no sense. ⁴
12	C. Defendants Continued to Turnback Asylum Seekers in 2017
13	Defendants claim that the "surge" of undocumented noncitizens arriving at
14	POEs ended in 2017 and that turnbacks ended "for the most part" shortly thereafter.
15	Opp. at 3, 21. Not so. CBP officers turned back asylum seekers at POEs in 2017.
16	See, e.g., Op. Ex. 8 at 043 (January 2, 2017); Ex. 14 (January 26, 2017); Ex. 15
17	(February 6, 2017); Ex. 16 at 388 (February 2017
18); Ex. 17 (April 1, 2017); Op. Ex. 52 (DHS
19	received); Ex. 18
20	(April 10, 2017); Ex. 19 (
21	
22	⁴ It is incorrect that " Constant " caused the closure of El Centro. <i>See</i> CM at 18. The head of CBP's Crisis Action Team noted that
23	Ex. 13 at 878. Furthermore. Defendants' excuse for closing the Nogales. Facility makes no sense.
24	CM at 18.
25	. Op. Ex. 61 at 530. The only significant change between November 4, 2016, when the Nogales Facility was on
26	the path to opening, and November 15, 2016 when it was placed on hold, was that Donald Trump had been elected President and OFO had rolled out turnbacks border-
27	wide. See Op. Br. at 10-11.
28	. <i>See</i> CM at 20.

); Ex. 20 (May 12, 2017); Ex. 21 (May 18, 1 2017); Ex. 22 at 395 (August 26, 2017); Ex. 23 at 411 (December 5, 2017); Ex. 24 2 (December 7, 2017); Ex. 25 (December 8, 2017); Ex. 26 (December 9, 2017); Ex. 3 27 (December 11, 2017); Ex. 28 (December 12, 2017); Ex. 29 (December 15, 2017); 4 5 Ex. 30 (December 17, 2017); Ex. 31 at 450 (December 18, 2017). And those exhibits are a drop in the bucket. It is simply not true that Defendants stopped turning back 6 asylum seekers in 2017. They kept turning back asylum seekers because the turnback 7 policy has nothing to do with the capacity of POEs. See Ex. 38 at ¶ 22, 102-23; Ex. 8 1 at 16 (San Luis POE staff admitted "they could process more asylum seekers than 9 10 they were processing"). D. The April 2018 Migrant Caravan Never Materialized 11 Defendants claim that CBP's April 2018 metering guidance was issued in 12

response to a fast-approaching migrant caravan that would overwhelm POEs. See 13 CM at 22-23. But Defendants ignore their own data. From late March until late April 14 15 2018, . See, e.g., Ex. 32. That data shows that 16 On March 31, 2018, Op. Ex. 80 at 793. By 17 April 22, 2018, . Id. at 784. A 18 day later, on April 23, 2018, there were only " " in the group. 19 *Id.* at 783. These asylum seekers did not even reach Tijuana at the same time. 20 Id. The Mexican government saw to it that caravan members " 21 " Id. Many of 22 the asylum seekers who reached Tijuana were not even able 23 to make it to the border. Id. Mexican authorities set up " 24 " Id. That is why, by April 29, 2018, 25 " Ex. 33 at 694. Even 26 though the April 2018 migrant caravan was dispersed and would clearly pose no 27 28 logistical challenges to POEs, Defendants persisted with their plan to memorialize REPLY IN SUPP. OF PLTFS' MOT S.J. 1

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the turnback policy on April 27, 2018 and enforced that policy. See Op. Ex. 82.

E. The Turnback Policy Is Costly, Dangerous, and Illegal

Defendants claim that the turnback policy was "successful." CM at 4. The
thousands of class members living in unofficial refugee camps on the Mexican side
of the border beg to differ.⁵



Under the turnback policy, CBP officers lied, and asylum seekers died. Op. Br. at
16-18, 26-27. Anyone who calls that a "success" needs to open a dictionary.

Even measured by other standards, the turnback policy is a terrible idea. CBP officers repeatedly complained that it put their safety at risk. *See, e.g.*, Op. Ex. 1 at 172:14-17; Op. Ex. 3 at 149:23-150:1. Because "[t]he safety of CBP employees" is supposed to be "paramount during all aspects of CBP operations," CM Ex. 59 at 044, these safety flaws should have doomed the turnback policy from the start.

Moreover, turning back asylum seekers at the limit line between the U.S. and
Mexico created a new problem at POEs—so-called "Op. Ex. 14 at
189:6-191:20.

. Id. at 198:25-

²⁶
 ⁵ Caitlin Dickerson, *Inside the Refugee Camp on America's Doorstep*, N.Y. Times (Oct. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/23/us/mexico-migrant-camp-asylum.html.

7 "success"—all you need to do is ignore the fact that it killed and endangered asylum
8 seekers, cost more money, placed CBP officers in harm's way, and broke the law.

9

F. Defendants Rely on Self-Contradictory Arguments

10 In addition to getting the facts wrong, Defendants' view of the facts is selfcontradictory. A chief example of this is how Defendants cite CBP's capacity data. 11 When Defendants believe that POEs had high capacity utilization numbers, 12 Defendants cite those documents as a justification for turning back asylum seekers. 13 See CM at 15. But when POEs reported low capacity utilization numbers, 14 15 Defendants argue that those figures are meaningless because "[a] port's capacity to hold individuals is not a fixed number," CM at 24, and the figures are therefore 16 incomplete and inaccurate. Id. These figures are either meaningful or meaningless, 17 but Defendants cannot have it both ways. And "capacity" is certainly not a one-way 18 ratchet. Defendants focus on factors constraining capacity ignores ways that they 19 could expand their capacity by utilizing U.S. Border Patrol stations and soft-sided 20 facilities. Therefore, Defendants' attempt to conjure factual disputes is not genuine. 21 22 It cannot defeat summary judgment. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 ("When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, 23 so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of 24 the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."). 25

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
IV. EVEN IF DEFENDANTS ARE CORRECT THAT TURNBACKS ARE A DELAY, THAT DELAY IS UNREASONABLE

Plaintiffs maintain that turnbacks amount to unlawful withholding of a

mandatory duty in every instance, but Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment 1 on their APA § 706(1) claim even if Defendants are correct in characterizing 2 turnbacks as "[a]t most, agency action [that] is delayed." CM at 40. Such delays are 3 unreasonable across the board under the "TRAC factors." See Indep. Mining Co. v. 4 5 Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).⁶ Based on the undisputed facts, 6 the TRAC analysis weighs heavily in Plaintiffs' favor. 7

Factor 1: When and whether a metered asylum seeker will ever be processed 8 under the turnback policy is an arbitrary decision made in a black box and is not 9 10 based on a "rule of reason." Wait times for metered asylum seekers have ranged from days to many months, . CM Opp. 11

Exs. 6-7; Op. Ex. 100 at 247:2-5. Various features of the turnback policy make clear 12 the arbitrary nature of these inspection delays. Defendants require asylum seekers to 13 use a waitlist system operated by third parties in Mexico, but do not know how the 14 15 system works or even *if* it works, or how long the delay might take. Op. Ex. 14 at



⁶ The *TRAC* factors are: (1) whether the agency's timeline is governed by a "rule of reason"; (2) whether "Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute"; (3) & (5) (usually considered together) the "nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the delay," with delays "that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake"; (4) "the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority"; and (6) whether the agency acted in bad faith, though bad faith is not necessary to find a delay unreasonable. *Id.* at 507 25 26 27

n.7. 28

individuals Defendants requested from Mexican officials that day (if they requested 1 any at all). See Op. Ex. 4 at 171:7-13. But there is no guarantee that operation of the 2 waitlists is not completely arbitrary-that Mexican officials will follow the order on 3 the lists, Dkt. 591-1 ¶¶ 8-10, or that all class members will even be allowed to utilize 4 the lists, Dkt. 390-101 ¶¶ 12-13. Class members are thrown to the proverbial 5 wolves—turned back, told to participate in an opaque, informal waitlist "process" 6 that may or may not return them to the POE for processing and inspection, and left 7 to survive on their own in the interim.⁷ "The 'rule' appears to be that once" 8 Defendants prevent an asylum seeker from accessing the POE, they "abdicate[] 9 responsibility for" what happens next. Hong Wang v. Chertoff, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 10 1259 (W.D. Wash. 2008). "Where [Defendants] ha[ve] been assigned the mandatory 11 duty to [inspect arriving noncitizens], this policy cannot be considered a 'rule of 12 reason."" Id. 13

Furthermore, the "Prioritization-Based Queue Management" memos inject 14 unwarranted discretion into the decision to inspect any asylum seekers at all, which 15 in turn impacts inspection wait times. Op. Ex. 98; CM Ex. 5. Under the memos, 16 POEs "must" prioritize certain activities ahead of inspecting and processing asylum 17 seekers, after which they "have discretion to allocate resources and staffing" as they 18 wish. Op. Ex. 98; CM Ex. 5. Purporting to grant agency actors discretion to 19 undertake a mandatory duty runs counter to the principle of reasoned 20 decisionmaking; "[t]he APA is not intended to permit agencies to define the 21 reasonability of their actions by issuing their own memoranda." Asmai v. Johnson, 22 23 182 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1095 (E.D. Cal. 2016). Merely adopting a policy to delay

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⁷ Op. Ex. 14 at 234:25-235:20 (if CBP prevents an asylum seeker from crossing the limit line. "

inspecting asylum seekers, as Defendants did here, is not a rule of reason. *Id.*⁸

Factor 2: The "statutory context" strongly suggests that any delay of days, 2 weeks, or months before an asylum seeker is inspected is unreasonable. Santillan v. 3 Gonzales, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2005). As this Court has previously 4 held, § 1225(a)(3) requires Defendants to inspect all noncitizens who are in the 5 process of arriving at a POE. Dkt. 280 at 45-46. The duty does not apply only with 6 regard to asylum seekers—it encompasses all who are "applicants for admission" or 7 "otherwise seeking admission." Inspections must occur around the time that a 8 noncitizen arrives at the POE, rather than days, weeks, or months, later.⁹ And CBP 9 handily inspects nearly all of the hundreds of thousands of people subject to 10 inspection each day, in roughly the order the applicants arrive. These inspections are 11 the bread and butter of POEs' functioning, and international travel would grind to a 12 halt if such inspections did not occur as a matter of course upon arrival. If CBP 13 officers at airports delayed inspections for weeks, arriving travelers would be stuck 14 sleeping inside airports. At land borders, students would never make it to school, 15 and employees would miss work if inspections were not required at the time of 16 arrival. Indeed, Defendants never acted otherwise prior to the adoption of the 17 turnback policy. Op. Ex. 14 at 53:21-56:1 (CBP 30(b)(6) witness with 21 years of 18 service at CBP and its predecessor agency could not recall 19

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21 December 21
22 be interpreted in the context of this daily hubbub at POEs that the statute is meant to
23 regulate.

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²⁶ ⁹ Congress's decision to create special protections for asylum seekers arriving in the United States—barring their expedited removal without first giving them access to the asylum process, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii)—reinforces the point that metering is unreasonable because it places such individuals in danger.

 ⁸ In addition, wait times are disconnected from the actual capacity of ports of entry, further eroding any claim that the challenged delays are based on a rule of reason.
 See Op. Br. 26-29; CM Opp. at 11-18.

Factors 3 & 5: The nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the 1 turnback policy-human life and physical well-being-cannot be overstated and 2 weigh strongly in Plaintiffs' favor. The scale of the crisis created by turnbacks has 3 been enormous, and it includes makeshift camps in Mexican border towns that lack 4 5 toilets and clean water, as well as human trafficking and violence against those forced to wait. See Op. Br. at 16-18. Courts routinely find these factors weigh in 6 favor of relief based on much less serious harm. Singh v. Napolitano, 909 F. Supp. 7 2d 1164, 1176 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (finding this factor weighed in a petitioner's favor 8 because it involved "humanitarian concerns"—Singh was "an asylee who [was] 9 attempting to become a lawful permanent resident"); Tufail v. Neufeld, 2016 WL 10 1587218, at *8 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (ongoing insecurity about one's immigration status 11 weighed in favor of relief); Latifi v. Neufeld, 2015 WL 3657860, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 12 2015) (being required to renew work authorization ever year was a hardship 13 weighing in plaintiff's favor). 14

15 Factor 4: While Defendants argue that turnbacks are justified by a discretionary decision to prioritize other activities, Defendants' own records show 16 that they routinely engaged in metering even when the processing of asylum seekers 17 was not impacting port operations. Op. Ex. 38 at ¶¶ 22, 101-23. But "[e]ven 18 assuming that [Defendants] have numerous competing priorities under the fourth 19 factor," delay may still be unreasonable when other factors weigh heavily in favor 20 of relief, and particularly when "there is a clear threat to human welfare." In re 21 Community Voice, 878 F.3d 779, 787 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding unreasonable delay 22 when children were "severely prejudiced" by lead poisoning, even assuming the 23 agency acted in good faith to juggle competing priorities); Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 24 879, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[An agency's] plea[s] of ... administrative convenience, 25 practical difficulty in carrying out a legislative mandate, or need to prioritize in the 26 face of limited resources . . . become less persuasive as delay progresses, and must 27 always be balanced against the potential for harm."). Furthermore, "if the only effect 28 REPLY IN SUPP. OF of expediting [agency action] is the loss of an authority that . . . is *ultra vires*," such
 as turning away asylum seekers, *see* Op. Br. at 7-16, the fourth factor "does not
 militate in [the agency's] favor." *Mugumoke v. Curda*, 2012 WL 113800, at *9 (E.D.
 Cal. 2012).

5 *Factor 6:* This Court may also invalidate the turnback policy because it was adopted in bad faith. While a finding of bad faith is not necessary for a court to find 6 unreasonable delay, in this case each turnback and the turnback policy are 7 unlawful—resulting in delay that is unreasonable *per se* under the *TRAC* factors 8 9 because turnbacks were based on a pretext and not driven by capacity constraints, 10 and are therefore the result of bad faith. Cutler, 818 F.2d at 898 ("If the court determines that the agency delays in bad faith, it should conclude that the delay is 11 unreasonable."). Here, Defendants have "manifested bad faith . . . by singling . . . 12 out [asylum seekers] for bad treatment," based on a pretextual excuse of lack of 13 capacity, and therefore, they "will have a hard time claiming legitimacy for [their] 14 priorities." In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Op. Br. at 26-15 29; CM Opp. 11-18.¹⁰ 16

In addition, Defendants are not "free to make ... administrative changes with 17 the intent to defeat the mandate of the law by making the process so slow and/or 18 cumbersome to ensure" that only a small number of asylum seekers are ever 19 20 processed at POEs. *Babbitt*, 105 F.3d at 510. Yet that is exactly what Defendants did. Defendants engaged in turnbacks to avoid projecting a public image of an 21 efficient system for processing asylum seekers at the border, in an effort to deter 22 people from attempting to access that system. See supra at 3-5. This manufactured 23 delay evinces bad faith. Babbitt, 105 F.3d at 510. 24

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- V. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF THEY SEEK
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 ¹⁰ The turnback policy was also adopted in bad faith because it is the result of long-standing racial animus toward Haitian asylum seekers, Dkt. 600-2 at 3-19, and a desire to deter all asylum seekers, Dkt. 601-2 at 3-19.

1

A. The Court Should Enter a Permanent Injunction

The Court should enter a permanent injunction prohibiting all forms of 2 turnbacks, requiring Defendants to inspect asylum seekers as they arrive at POEs, 3 and restoring those previously metered to their legal status quo ante. Injunctive relief 4 5 is necessary because Defendants' turnback policy reveals "past and present misconduct [that] indicates a strong likelihood of future violations." Orantes-6 Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 564 (9th Cir. 1990). This "past and present 7 misconduct" consists of more than the countless individual turnbacks committed by 8 CBP officers, because Defendants chose not to memorialize the turnback policy for 9 nearly two years. See Op. Br. at 12-15, 36. Thus, appropriate relief for Defendants' 10 policy of denying asylum seekers access to the U.S. asylum process must address 11 not only the memorialized aspects of this policy but all the past and present practices 12 that have been used under the policy to effectuate and legitimize turnbacks. This 13 Court should not ignore the likelihood of future violations that Defendants' past 14 15 practice reveals, and that injunctive relief is meant to address.¹¹

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B. Vacatur Is Not Appropriate or Sufficient Relief

17 Defendants' argument that vacatur is an adequate alternative remedy is without merit. Tellingly, Defendants never specify what exactly this court could 18 vacate to provide Plaintiffs the relief they seek. Nor could they. Plaintiffs do not 19 20 challenge a single regulation, memo, or executive order, but rather a comprehensive policy to deny asylum seekers access to the U.S. asylum process that was enacted 21 through multiple directives because Defendants decided not to memorialize their 22 illegal conduct for nearly two years. Vacating a single memorandum or directive 23 will not stop Defendants from creating new directives to achieve the same objective. 24 In fact, the uncontested facts demonstrate that since 2016, when challenges to 25

 ¹¹ Although Plaintiffs submit that they are entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief, the parties agree that briefing on the appropriate scope of the remedy following the Court's ruling on the merits may be warranted. *See* CM at 58.

Defendants' practices of turning back asylum seekers first arose, Defendants' 1 created new directives to explain and justify these practices. See Op. Br. at 12-15. 2 Even after OIG suggested that CBP's decision to stop processing asylum seekers at 3 seven POEs was illegal, CBP still refused to change its conduct. Ex. 1 at 21. The 4 5 only way "to combat [such] a 'pattern' of illicit . . . behavior" is to prohibit all forms of turnbacks and affirmatively require Defendants to inspect asylum seekers as they 6 arrive at POEs. LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[t]he 7 Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the appropriateness of federal injunctive 8 relief" to address such patterns of behavior), amended on other grounds by 796 F.2d 9 10 309 (9th Cir. 1986). That vacatur may be an adequate remedy for certain APA violations does not make it an adequate remedy for the APA violations in this case.¹² 11

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C. Plaintiffs Meet the Remaining Factors for Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs meet all the requisite factors for permanent injunctive relief. See 13 Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874, 895 (9th Cir. 2020); Op. Br. 26-39; supra at 16. 14 15 *First*, Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs have failed to show irreparable injury, and therefore Defendants concede the harm. See CM at 58-60; see Day v. D.C. 16 DCRA 191 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159 (D.D.C. 2002). Regardless, it is uncontroversial 17 that Defendants' commission of statutory, constitutional, and international legal 18 violations that put asylum seekers in grave danger in Mexico and deny them access 19 20 to the U.S. asylum process constitutes irreparable harm. See Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073, 1093 (9th Cir. 2020) (returning non-Mexicans to Mexico where 21 they "risk substantial harm, even death" while waiting for further steps in the U.S. 22 asylum process constitutes irreparable injury). 23

¹² The two cases Defendants cite to support their vacatur argument are inapposite. *California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Dep't of Energy* analyzed a specific
government study issued in violation of statutory guidelines—not a series of
multiple directives and practices comprising an unwritten policy. 631 F.3d 1072,
1095 (9th Cir. 2011). *Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms* is irrelevant because
the Plaintiff in that case agreed that vacatur was sufficient—not so here. 561 U.S.
139, 165-66 (2010).

Second, the balance of the hardships and the public interest—which should be 1 considered together when the government is a party—weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. 2 See Sierra Club, 963 F.3d at 895. Without injunctive relief, class members will 3 continue to face the statutory, constitutional, and international law violations that 4 5 result in grave risk of serious harm and even death in Mexico. See Op. Br. at 26-39. Defendants' hardship, even if administratively burdensome, amounts to fulfilling 6 their statutory mandate, which they are not allowed to neglect or diminish in any 7 way. Defendants direct the Court to 6 U.S.C. § 211(c), see CM at passim, which 8 requires that CBP "enforce and administer all immigration laws . . . including . . . 9 the inspection, processing, and admission of persons who seek to enter ... the United 10 States." Id. § 211(c)(8)(A). Until the turnback policy, CBP fulfilled this statutory 11 mandate and processed asylum seekers in the same way they process everyone else 12 arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border; that is, in the order that they arrive. Any 13 diversion of resources or costs associated with enjoining the turnback policy and 14 15 returning to prior lawful practices would be hardships of Defendants' own making.

And, "[t]here is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful 16 agency action." League of Women Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 17 2016); see also EBSC v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018) (the public "has 18 an interest in ensuring that 'statutes enacted by [their] representatives' are not 19 imperiled by executive fiat"). An injunction ensuring access to the U.S. asylum 20 process will "prevent[] [noncitizens] from being wrongfully removed, particularly 21 to countries where they are likely to face substantial harm," which is "of course" in 22 the public interest. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 436 (2009). Thus, Plaintiffs have 23 satisfied the requirements for injunctive relief and the Court should enter an 24 injunction prohibiting all forms of turnbacks, requiring Defendants to inspect asylum 25 seekers as they arrive at POEs, and restoring previously-metered asylum seekers to 26 27

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the same legal status they would have had absent metering.¹³

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D. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) Does Not Bar Relief

Section 1252(f)(1) does not bar injunctive relief in this case, because Plaintiffs 3 seek to enforce 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) and (b), and not to "enjoin or restrain the 4 5 operation of" the statute. Although \S 1252(f)(1) serves to limit injunctive relief, it does so only so far as an injunction would "enjoin or restrain the operation of" certain 6 removal statutes within the INA. It does not limit an injunction seeking to enjoin "a 7 violation of the statutes." Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010); 8 see Torres v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 9 10 2019) (holding that § 1252(f)(1) does not apply where the relief, "far from preventing the operation of the INA, seeks to enforce its provisions"). 11

Plaintiffs seek to enjoin agency action that violates Defendants' inspection 12 and processing duties under § 1225(a) and (b). See Op. Br. at 36-38. Where, as here, 13 Plaintiffs "seek[] to enjoin conduct that allegedly is not even authorized by the 14 15 statute, the court is not enjoining the operation of [the removal statutes], and \S 1252(f)(1) therefore is not implicated." Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 16 2003), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Ali v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 17 2005). Defendants strain to make \S 1252(f)(1) apply by arguing that Plaintiffs are 18 seeking to enjoin the operation of §1225(a) and (b) "by rewriting it to apply to aliens" 19 outside the United States." CM at 58. First, this mischaracterization blatantly 20 disregards this Court's prior finding that "the plain language and legislative 21 histor[y]" of § 1225(b) "support[] the conclusion that the statute applies to asylum 22 seekers in the process of arriving." Dkt. 330 at 5. Furthermore, because the turnback 23 policy denies the operation of § 1225(a) and (b) to those asylum seekers in the 24 process of arriving, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin a violation of the statute. Defendants 25

¹³ If questions about interpretation and implementation arise with respect to any permanent injunction, this Court can appointment a special master to oversee the implementation of the injunction. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a) (1)(C).

may not like the Court's prior holding, but they certainly may not buttress a failed 1 legal argument into a bar to relief. Section 1252(f)(1) "is not implicated" in this case 2 and, therefore, does not bar the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek. Ali, 346 F.3d at 886. 3

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E. **The Court Should Enter Declaratory Relief**

In addition to injunctive relief, this Court should enter a declaratory judgment 5 that the turnback policy violates the INA, the APA, class members' procedural due 6 process rights under the Fifth Amendment, and the Alien Tort Statute.¹⁴ 7 "[D]eclaratory relief has long been recognized as distinct in purpose from . . . 8 injunctions." Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1120; see McGraw-Edison Co. v. Preformed 9 Line Products Co., 362 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1966). Here, in addition to an 10 injunction prohibiting all turnbacks, a declaration from the Court that turnbacks 11 violate § 1225(b) "will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at 12 issue" between arriving noncitizens and CBP officers. GEICO v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 13 1220, 1225 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998).¹⁵ Declaratory relief would also be of assistance to 14 CBP officers who are "still unclear" on whether turnbacks are illegal. Ex. 1 at 12. 15 This Court should grant the requested injunctive and declaratory relief. 16

- VI. 17
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CONCLUSION

Summary judgment should be entered for Plaintiffs.

- Dated: October 30, 2020 19
- 20

MAYER BROWN LLP

21 ¹⁴ Notably, a declaratory judgment is not barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1).

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¹⁵ Defendants' reliance on *Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan* is misplaced. 770 F.2d 202, 208 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In *Sanchez-Espinoza*, the court questioned whether it could grant discretionary relief of any kind where it was asked to address the legality of support for military operations in a foreign country. *Id.* at 208. The court clarified that "*in a context such as this* where federal officers are defendants," a declaratory judgment to terminate support would be "the practical equivalent of specific relief such as an injunction or mandamus." *Id.* at 208 n.8 (emphasis added). Here, the declaratory relief would establish CBP officers' legal obligations to those in the process of arriving, something that *CBP* officers. In *this* case, both are necessary to afford Plaintiffs and class members complete relief. 25

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing document to be served on all
3	counsel via the Court's CM/ECF system.
4	Dated: October 30, 2020
5	MAYER BROWN LLP
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7	By <u>/s/ Stephen M. Medlock</u>
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