



## **Court Decision Ensures Asylum Seekers Notice of the One-Year Filing Deadline and an Adequate Mechanism to Timely File Applications**

### **Frequently Asked Questions<sup>1</sup>** **April 13, 2018**

#### **Introduction**

Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington recently issued a significant decision regarding the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications. The decision has nationwide implications for thousands of asylum seekers. On March 29, 2018, in *Mendez Rojas v. Johnson*, 2018 WL 1532715 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2018), the court held that the government's failure to provide adequate notice of the one-year deadline constitutes a violation of the immigration statute, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and class members' due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. In addition, the court held that the government's failure to provide a uniform mechanism through which class members can timely file their asylum applications also violates the immigration statute and the APA. Therefore, the court ordered that the government adopt a notice of the one-year filing deadline and provide this notice to all current and future class members. Further, the court ordered the government to adopt, publicize, and implement uniform procedural mechanisms that will allow class members to file their asylum applications in a timely manner.

#### **Who is covered by the decision?**

To benefit from this decision, an individual must be a member of one of the two classes certified in the case:

**Class A** comprises individuals who:

- Have been or will be released from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) custody after having been found to have a credible fear of persecution within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v); and
- Did not receive a notice from DHS of the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications; and
- Either
  - Have not filed an asylum application; or

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- Filed an asylum application more than one year after their arrival in the United States.

Additionally, Class A is divided into two sub-classes: 1) those who *are not* in removal proceedings; and 2) those who *are* in removal proceedings.

**Class B** comprises individuals who:

- Have been or will be detained by DHS upon their arrival into the country;
- Express a fear of return to their home country to a DHS official;
- Have been or will be released from DHS custody without a credible fear determination;
- Are issued a Notice to Appear (NTA);
- Did not receive a notice from DHS of the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications; and
- Either
  - Have not filed an asylum application; or
  - Filed an asylum application more than one year after their arrival in the United States.

Additionally, Class B is divided into two sub-classes: 1) those who *are not* in removal proceedings; and 2) those who *are* in removal proceedings.

### **What did the *Mendez Rojas* court decide?**

The court found that the government’s failure to provide adequate notice of the one-year deadline violated class members’ statutory right to apply for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), providing for relief under the APA. *Mendez Rojas*, 2018 WL 1532715 at \*3, 5.

Moreover, the court found that the notice the government claimed was provided to class members through a variety of documents and through the statute was insufficient. *Id.* at \*7-8. The court concluded that such notice was not “reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances of this case,” to afford class members adequate notice of the one-year deadline, in violation of their due process rights. *Id.* at \*6.

Finally, the court found that the immigration courts’ refusal to accept applications until an NTA is filed with the court, coupled with USCIS’s refusal to accept asylum applications from class members whose cases were not yet pending with an immigration court, operated to deprive class members of the opportunity to timely file their asylum applications. *Id.* at \*8-9. These refusals constituted a violation of class members’ statutory right to apply for asylum under the INA, and the court provided for relief under the APA. *Id.* at \*9.

### **What did the *Mendez Rojas* court order?**

Pursuant to its decision, the court ordered that:

- The government has until June 27, 2018, to adopt notice of the one-year deadline and thereafter provide notice to all current and future class members;

- The government must accept as timely filed any asylum application from a class member that is filed within one year of the date of adoption of the notice; and
- The government has until July 27, 2018, to adopt, publicize, and immediately implement uniform procedural mechanisms that will ensure class members are able to file their asylum applications in a timely manner.

### **Is the Court's order effective now?**

Yes. The court's decision became effective on the date that it was issued, March 29, 2018. Consequently, the period in which the government must issue a notice to class members began to run on that date, as did the period in which it must implement uniform procedures for filing asylum applications.

### **What happens if the government appeals?**

The government has until May 29, 2018 to appeal the decision. If it appeals, it also may seek a stay of the order until the circuit court decides the appeal. Unless such a stay is granted, the district court's order will remain in effect.

### **My client qualifies as a class member. What should I do?**

For class members with cases pending before EOIR, practitioners should notify the immigration judge of the decision in *Mendez Rojas* and their client's class membership. For class members whose cases are on appeal to the BIA, practitioners should similarly notify the BIA of their client's class membership. Enclosed is a sample Notice of Class Membership.

Class members with final orders of removal whose asylum applications were rejected due to failure to comply with the one-year deadline should consider filing a motion to reopen their order. Generally, an individual must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of entry of the final order. Practitioners whose clients' orders were issued more than 90 days ago can argue that the filing deadline should be equitably tolled based on the court's order and their diligent pursuit of their claim after learning about the order.<sup>2</sup> Class members in this situation can email class counsel at [kmacleod-ball@immcouncil.org](mailto:kmacleod-ball@immcouncil.org).

Per the court's order, the government must accept as timely filed an asylum application that is filed by a class member within one year of the government's adoption of the new notice of the one-year deadline, including those applications filed by class members before the court's order but more than a year after their arrival in the United States.

We will continue to update this FAQ as we learn more about the implementation of the court's order and any decision by the government to pursue an appeal.

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<sup>2</sup> For more information about motions to reopen and equitable tolling, see the American Immigration Council's Practice Advisory, [The Basics of Motions to Reopen EOIR-Issued Removal Orders](#).

[ADDRESS]

NOT DETAINED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW  
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT

[LOCATION]

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In The Matter of:	)	
	)	
[NAME]	)	
	)	A ### ## #
Respondent,	)	
	)	
In Removal Proceedings	)	
_____	)	

Immigration Judge: \*\*\* \*\*  
Next Individual Calendar Hearing: [DATE] at [TIME]

RESPONDENT'S NOTICE OF MENDEZ ROJAS CLASS MEMBERSHIP

## RESPONDENT'S NOTICE OF MENDEZ ROJAS CLASS MEMBERSHIP

The Respondent, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby notifies the Immigration Court that **she** is a member of a class certified in *Mendez Rojas v. Johnson*, No. 16-1024, 2017 WL 1397749 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 10, 2017) (order granting motion for class certification),<sup>1</sup> and that this Court must deem **her** asylum application to have been timely filed. *Mendez Rojas*, 2018 WL 1532715 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2018) (order granting motion for summary judgment).<sup>2</sup>

*Mendez Rojas* is a class action lawsuit that challenged the government's failure to provide certain asylum seekers with adequate notice of the one-year filing deadline, and its failure to provide a uniform mechanism through which they can timely file their asylum applications. *Id.* Defendants in the case were both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).

On January 10, 2017, the court certified the following classes and subclasses:

**CLASS A (“Credible Fear Class”):** All individuals who have been released or will be released from DHS custody after they have been found to have a credible fear of persecution within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(B)(v) and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application as set forth in 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(2)(B).

**A.I.:** All individuals in Class A who *are not* in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival.

**A.II.:** All individuals in Class A who *are* in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival.

**CLASS B (“Other Entrants Class”):** All individuals who have been or will be detained upon entry; express a fear of return to their country of origin; are released or will be released from DHS custody without a credible fear determination; are issued a Notice to Appear (NTA); and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application set forth in 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(2)(B).

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<sup>1</sup> The order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification appears at Exhibit A.

<sup>2</sup> The order granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment appears at Exhibit B.

**B.I.:** All individuals in Class B who *are not* in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival.

**B.II.:** All individuals in Class B who *are* in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival.

*Mendez Rojas*, 2017 WL 1397749 at \*7.

On March 29, 2018, the court issued an order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (hereinafter “Order”). *Mendez Rojas*, 2018 WL 1532715 at \*9. In granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the court found that the government’s failure to inform class members of the asylum filing deadline and to provide a uniform mechanism through which class members may timely submit their applications violates class members’ statutory and constitutional rights. *Id.* at \*3,5, 8-9. The Order requires, in pertinent part, that DHS adopt a notice of the one-year filing deadline, in consultation with class members, and thereafter provide notice to all class members who have already been released from DHS custody. *Id.* at \*9. The Order further directs the defendants—which includes EOIR—to accept as timely filed any asylum application filed by a class member that is filed within one year of the date of the adoption of the notice. *Id.*

The Respondent in this case is a member of *Mendez Rojas* Subclass A.II., because:

1. She was released from DHS custody, after she was deemed to have a credible fear of persecution. [CITE EVIDENCE]
2. She did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year filing deadline. *See Mendez Rojas*, 2018 WL 1532715 at \*8 (finding that DHS does “not provide sufficient notice of the one-year deadline to satisfy the Due Process clause”).
3. She is in removal proceedings.
4. She applied for asylum more than one year after her last arrival.

**[NOTE TO READER: THIS SAMPLE USES SUBCLASS A.II. AS AN EXAMPLE. BE SURE TO MODIFY IF THE CLIENT FALLS WITHIN ANOTHER CLASS OR SUBCLASS].**

Pursuant to the Order, this Court must deem the Respondent’s asylum application to have been timely filed because it was filed within one year—indeed, prior to—the notice mandated by *Mendez Rojas*.

Respectfully submitted,

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**XXX**

*Counsel for Respondent*

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Date

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW  
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT**

**[LOCATION]**

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In The Matter of: )  
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 )  
 **[NAME]** ) **A ### ### ###** )  
 )  
 Respondent, ) Next Individual Calendar Hearing )  
 ) **[DATE]** at **[TIME]** before Immigration )  
 In Removal Proceedings ) Judge **[NAME]** )  
 )  

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**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW  
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT**

**[LOCATION]**

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In The Matter of: )  
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 [NAME] ) A ### ### ### )  
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 Respondent, ) Next Individual Calendar Hearing )  
 ) [DATE] at [TIME] before Immigration )  
 In Removal Proceedings ) Judge [NAME] )  
 )  

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**PROOF OF SERVICE**

On the date indicated below, I, [COUNSEL NAME], served a copy of Respondent's Notice of *Mendez Rojas* Class Membership and any attached pages to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of the Chief Counsel at the following address: XXXXX, by FedEx.

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XXX  
*Counsel for Respondent*

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Date

# EXHIBIT A

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

CONCELY del CARMEN MENDEZ	)	
ROJAS, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	CASE NO. C16-1024RSM
	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	
	)	ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
v.	)	CLASS CERTIFICATION
	)	
JEH JOHNSON, Secretary of the	)	
Department of Homeland Security, in his	)	
official capacity, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	
_____	)	

**I. INTRODUCTION**

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification. Dkt. #7. Plaintiffs seek certification of two classes, each with two subclasses. *Id.* Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that the Plaintiffs lack standing, and fail to meet any of the class certification requirements. Dkt. #29. For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees with Defendants and now GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion.

**II. BACKGROUND**

Plaintiffs are asylum seekers who challenge Defendants’ alleged failure to provide them, and the classes they move to represent, with notice of the statutory requirement that an asylum seeker must apply for asylum within one year of arrival in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), as well as Defendants’ alleged failure to provide a mechanism that ensures that

1 an asylum seeker is able to comply with that deadline. Dkt. #1. Plaintiffs allege that  
2 Defendants' policies and practices infringe on their and the proposed putative class members'  
3 statutory and regulatory rights to apply for asylum, often depriving them of those rights  
4 altogether, and also violate their right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United  
5 States Constitution. *Id.* Plaintiffs assert that the questions presented in this case – whether the  
6 DHS Defendants are obligated to provide Plaintiffs with notice of the one-year deadline when  
7 released from DHS custody, and whether the DHS and DOJ Defendants must provide a  
8 mechanism that ensures that Plaintiffs are able to apply for asylum in a timely manner – can  
9 and should be resolved on a class-wide basis. Dkt. #7 at 2.  
10

11 For context, Plaintiffs have provided a brief background of the proposed class  
12 representatives:  
13

14 Plaintiff Rodriguez is a 37-year-old asylum seeker from Honduras. Mr.  
15 Rodriguez entered the United States in July 2014 and established a credible  
16 fear of persecution in an interview with USCIS. Subsequently, DHS  
17 released him from custody with an NTA, the charging document in removal  
18 proceedings, but did not inform him of the one-year deadline. DHS has not  
19 placed Mr. Rodriguez in removal proceedings yet. He only learned of the  
20 deadline when he sought counsel for his immigration case. His attempts to  
21 comply with the one-year deadline have been unsuccessful, however, as  
22 both USCIS and EOIR have rejected his asylum application – USCIS  
23 rejected it on the assumption that Mr. Rodriguez was in removal  
24 proceedings, so the application had to be filed with EOIR; EOIR rejected  
25 the application Mr. Rodriguez attempted to lodge because he is not actually  
26 in removal proceedings. As a result, he has been unable to file, or even  
27 lodge, his asylum application. *See* Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 60-66.  
28

29 Plaintiff Mendez is a 30-year-old asylum seeker from the Dominican  
30 Republic. Ms. Mendez entered the United States in September 2013 and  
31 established a credible fear of persecution in an interview with USCIS.  
32 Subsequently, DHS released her from custody with an NTA, but did not  
33 inform her of the one-year deadline. She only learned of the deadline when  
34 she sought counsel for her immigration case – *after* one year had already  
35 passed. As she had not yet been placed in removal proceedings, Ms.  
36 Mendez attempted to file an asylum application with USCIS, but USCIS  
37 rejected it on the assumption that she already was in removal proceedings.  
38

1 Only after this rejection – and more than one year after she entered the  
2 country – did DHS file the NTA with the immigration court, allowing Ms.  
3 Mendez to finally lodge her asylum application with the San Antonio  
4 Immigration Court. Her first immigration court hearing will be in August  
5 2016. *See* Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 67-74.

6 Plaintiff Lopez is a 37-year-old asylum seeker from Guatemala. In  
7 February 2014, she arrived at a Texas port of entry with two of her children  
8 and told the inspecting officers that she was afraid to return to Guatemala.  
9 DHS served Ms. Lopez and her children with NTAs and released them from  
10 custody with the requirement that they check in with DHS on a regular  
11 basis. DHS did not inform her of the one-year deadline. Ms. Lopez  
12 checked in with DHS on four occasions between March 2014 and  
13 September 2015, yet at no point did DHS inform her of the one-year  
14 deadline. In October 2015, she was issued a notice of hearing for  
15 November 2015 in the San Antonio Immigration Court. Ms. Lopez did not  
16 learn of the one-year deadline until she consulted an immigration attorney  
17 in December 2015. She lodged her asylum application with the court in  
18 January 2016, nearly two years after she arrived in the United States. The  
19 immigration judge subsequently terminated her removal proceedings, and  
20 she filed an asylum application affirmatively with USCIS in February 2016.  
21 USCIS has not yet scheduled an interview regarding her asylum application.  
22 *See* Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 75-81.

23 Plaintiff Suarez is a 29-year-old asylum seeker from Mexico. She and her  
24 five young children arrived at a California port of entry in November 2013.  
25 Upon her arrival, Ms. Suarez informed DHS that she was afraid to return to  
26 Mexico and that she was seeking asylum in the United States. She provided  
27 DHS with a sworn statement regarding her fear of returning to Mexico.  
28 Shortly afterwards, DHS released her and her children from custody with  
NTAs, and paroled them into the country to await a removal hearing. At  
no point did DHS inform Ms. Suarez of the one-year deadline. She first  
learned of this requirement more than a year later, when she sought counsel.  
She then promptly lodged her application with the San Francisco  
Immigration Court. Ms. Suarez is scheduled for an individual hearing in  
May 2017. *See* Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 82-87.

Dkt. #7 at 8-10. In response to the instant motion, Defendants have not disputed these  
background facts as to each of the named Plaintiffs. *See* Dkt. #29.

Plaintiffs now request that the Court certify the following classes and subclasses:

**CLASS A (“Credible Fear Class”):** All individuals who have been  
released or will be released from DHS custody after they have been found  
to have a credible fear of persecution within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. §

1 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year  
2 deadline to file an asylum application as set forth in 8 U.S.C. §  
1158(a)(2)(B).

3 **A.I.:** All individuals in Class A who *are not* in removal proceedings and  
4 who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum  
after one year of their last arrival.

5 **A.II.:** All individuals in Class A who *are* in removal proceedings and who  
6 either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one  
7 year of their last arrival.

8 Dkt. #7 at 2.

9 **CLASS B (“Other Entrants Class”):** All individuals who have been or  
10 will be detained upon entry; express a fear of return to their country of  
11 origin; are released or will be released from DHS custody without a credible  
12 fear determination; are issued a Notice to Appear (NTA); and did not  
receive notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum  
application set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).

13 **B.I.:** All individuals in Class B who *are not* in removal proceedings and  
14 who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum  
after one year of their last arrival.

15 **B.II.:** All individuals in Class B who *are* in removal proceedings and who  
16 either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one  
17 year of their last arrival.

18 Dkt. #7 at 3.

19 Plaintiffs propose that Plaintiffs Elmer Geovanni Rodriguez Escobar and Concely del  
20 Carmen Mendez Rojas be appointed as representatives of Class A. Plaintiff Rodriguez moves  
21 to be appointed as representative of Subclass A.I., and Plaintiff Mendez Rojas moves to be  
22 appointed as representative of Subclass A.II. Dkt. #7 at 2. Plaintiffs further propose that  
23 Plaintiffs Maribel Suarez Garcia and Lidia Margarita Lopez Orellana be appointed as  
24 representatives of Class B. Plaintiff Lopez Orellana moves to be appointed as representative of  
25 Subclass B.I., and Plaintiff Suarez moves to be appointed as representative of Subclass B.II.  
26  
27

28 Dkt. #7 at 3.

1 Plaintiffs also ask that the Court adopt the following definitions of certain terms for  
2 purposes of all four subclasses:

3 an individual has “applied” for asylum when her application on Form I-589  
4 is accepted, and not subsequently rejected, by either Defendant U.S.  
5 Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or Defendant EOIR. An  
6 application is rejected by USCIS where USCIS refuses to accept it or  
7 subsequently issues a rejection notice. An application is rejected by EOIR  
8 where EOIR refuses to accept it. Pursuant to current EOIR policy, an  
9 application is not “filed” if it is accepted for “lodging” purposes only. *See*  
10 *Imm. Ct. Practice Manual 3.1(b)(iii)(A)*.

11 Dkt. #7 at 2 fn. 1.

### 12 III. DISCUSSION

#### 13 A. Legal Standard

14 “Class certification is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.” *Wal-Mart*  
15 *Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338, 345, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011). Under  
16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), the party seeking certification must first  
17 demonstrate that “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)  
18 there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the  
19 representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the  
20 representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ.  
21 P. 23(a). “Second, the proposed class must satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed  
22 in Rule 23(b).” *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 345; *see also Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc.*, 716 F.3d 510,  
23 512 (9th Cir. 2013). In this case, Plaintiffs seek to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2), which  
24 requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply  
25 generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is  
26 appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Dkt. #7 at 23-24; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “Rule  
27  
28

1 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to  
2 each member of the class.” *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 360.

3 Rule 23 “does not set forth a mere pleading standard.” *Id.* at 350. Rather, “certification  
4 is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of  
5 Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” *Id.* at 350-51 (internal quotation omitted). “[I]t may be  
6 necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification  
7 question.” *Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 72 L. Ed. 2d  
8 740 (1982). This is because “the class determination generally involves considerations that are  
9 enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.” *Id.*  
10 (internal quotation omitted). Nonetheless, the ultimate decision regarding class certification  
11 “involve[s] a significant element of discretion.” *Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co.*, 594  
12 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010).

## 15 **B. Certification**

16 Plaintiffs assert that their proposed classes and subclasses satisfy all Rule 23(a) and  
17 Rule 23(b)(2) requirements. Accordingly, the Court addresses those arguments, in turn, below.

### 19 *1. Numerosity and Standing*

20 “The prerequisite of numerosity is discharged if ‘the class is so large that joinder of all  
21 members is impracticable.’” *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998)  
22 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)). Plaintiffs assert that the proposed classes are numerous.  
23 Dkt. #7 at 14-16. Plaintiffs provide statistics for Fiscal Year 2016 from the Asylum Division of  
24 Defendant USCIS to assert that thousands of noncitizens express a fear of persecution to the  
25 DHS Defendants upon their arrival into the United States each month. *See* Asylum Division,  
26 USCIS, “Credible Fear Workload Report Summary: FY 2016 Total Caseload,” at 1 *available at*  
27  
28



1 <https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engage>  
2 [ments/CredibleFearReasonableFearStatisticsNationalityReports.pdf](https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engage) (last visited Jan. 9, 2017).

3 Further, during that same year, the Asylum Division determined that 36,324 individuals who  
4 were originally detained and placed in expedited removal proceedings had a “credible fear” of  
5 persecution if returned to their home countries. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiffs believe that the  
6 majority, if not all, of these 36,324 individuals are putative Class A members.  
7

8 In addition, Plaintiffs have presented Declarations from immigration attorneys around  
9 the country supporting the assertion that both Class A and Class B membership is too numerous  
10 for joinder. *See* Dkts. #13 at ¶¶ 3-6 and #19 at ¶¶ 5, 8 and 12-15. Finally, Plaintiffs note that  
11 “Defendants are in possession of the precise number of proposed class members, but Plaintiffs  
12 have demonstrated that the number of current and future class members, and the numerous  
13 reasons why it would be impractical to join them . . .”  
14

15 Based on this evidence, “general knowledge,” and “common sense,” the Court can infer  
16 that both putative classes and their subclasses are sufficiently large. *Perez-Funez v. Dist. Dir.*,  
17 *I.N.S.*, 611 F. Supp. 990, 995 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Further, each putative subclass includes  
18 “unnamed and unknown future” asylum applicants, and joinder of such “individuals is  
19 inherently impracticable.” *Jordan v. L.A. Cty.*, 669 F.2d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1982), *vacated on*  
20 *other grounds*, 459 U.S. 810, 103 S. Ct. 35, 74 L. Ed. 2d 48.  
21

22 However, the Court must also address Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs cannot meet  
23 the numerosity standard because none of the Plaintiffs can demonstrate an actual injury, and  
24 therefore they do not have standing. Dkt. #29 at 6-7. Standing has three elements: (1) an  
25 “injury in fact;” (2) a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of;”  
26 and (3) redressability, meaning that the injury is likely capable of being redressed by a  
27  
28

1 favorable decision. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L.  
2 Ed. 2d 351 (1992). In a class action, standing is satisfied if “at least one named plaintiff meets  
3 the requirements.” *Bates v. UPS*, 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007). In this case, Defendants  
4 argue that none of the representative Plaintiffs has experienced any injury in fact, and that any  
5 future injury is purely speculative because they don’t know whether their asylum applications  
6 will be denied. Dkt. #29 at 6-7.

7  
8 The Court is not persuaded. Plaintiffs are not challenging any denial, past or future, of  
9 asylum. *See* Dkt. #30 at 3. Rather, they challenge “their right to timely apply for asylum.” *Id.*  
10 That is, they challenge the denial of an opportunity to apply within the one-year deadline,  
11 which they allege is caused by Defendants’ failure to provide adequate notice of the deadline  
12 and an alleged failure to implement a uniform method through which Plaintiffs can comply  
13 with that deadline. *Id.* The Ninth Circuit has made clear that Plaintiffs and the proposed class  
14 members have a statutory right to apply for asylum:  
15

16 Section 201(b) of the Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, conferred upon all  
17 aliens a statutory right to apply for asylum. *Orantes-Hernandez v.*  
18 *Thornburgh*, 919 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1990). That right may be violated  
19 by a pattern or practice that forecloses the opportunity to apply. *See Id.* at  
20 564 (upholding finding that coercion of aliens to accept voluntary departure  
21 violated their right to apply for asylum). The same provision of the  
22 Refugee Act required the Attorney General to establish means by which  
23 aliens, regardless of status, may apply for political asylum. *See* 8 U.S.C. §  
24 1158.

25 *Campos v. Nail*, 43 F.3d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs allege that the failures by  
26 Defendants have caused them to lose this right, and they must now rely on an immigration  
27 judge to find, in his or her discretion, that either changed circumstances or extraordinary  
28 circumstances justified their delayed filings. Dkt. #30 at 2; 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) and 8  
C.F.R. § § 208.4(a)(2)(B), a(4)-(5). If Plaintiffs’ allegations are true, they have lost the

1 statutory right to apply for asylum and must now depend on the discretion of an adjudicator to  
2 apply. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated standing.

3 Defendants next argue that this Court has no jurisdiction to review asylum applications,  
4 and that such applications must go to review in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Dkt. #29 at 7-8.  
5 Again, that argument misconstrues Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs are not asking this Court to  
6 make any finding with respect to how immigration judges analyze the extraordinary  
7 circumstances exception. Rather, they allege that Defendants' action or inactions have  
8 deprived them of a statutory right to apply for asylum by foreclosing their opportunity to apply  
9 as of right. *See* Dkt. #30 at 4. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing.  
10

11 Because the only arguments that Defendants present in response to Plaintiffs' assertion  
12 of numerosity pertained to standing, and based on the evidence of numerosity presented by  
13 Plaintiffs as discussed above, the Court concludes that the proposed classes and their subclasses  
14 are sufficiently numerous to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1).  
15

## 16 2. *Commonality*

17 The requirement of "commonality" is met through the existence of a "common  
18 contention" that is of "such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution." *Dukes*, 564 U.S.  
19 at 350. A contention is capable of classwide resolution if "the determination of its truth or  
20 falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one  
21 stroke." *Id.* Accordingly, "what matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common  
22 questions – even in droves – but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate  
23 common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation." *Id.* This requirement is  
24 "construed permissively." *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1019. Accordingly, "[a]ll questions of fact and  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 law need not be common to satisfy the rule.” *Id.*; *see also Rodriguez v. Hayes*, 591 F.3d 1105,  
2 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).

3 In this case, the Plaintiffs and proposed class members allege a violation of their  
4 statutory right to apply for asylum, including adequate notice of the statutory deadline and a  
5 meaningful opportunity to comply with that deadline. Dkt. #7 at 17-18. Those claims are also  
6 based on a common core of facts. *Id.* at 18. Defendants argue again that none of the Plaintiffs  
7 have demonstrated an injury in fact, and therefore cannot demonstrate commonality. Dkt. #29  
8 at 8. The Court has already rejected that argument. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs  
9 cannot demonstrate commonality because the resolution of the claims requires an  
10 individualized inquiry, and the government actually provides notice of the one-year deadline in  
11 several circumstances. Dkt. #29 at 8-10. This argument misses the mark. Plaintiffs assert that  
12 Defendants do not have a policy and practice of advising the proposed members of the classes  
13 of the filing deadline, and that they do not have an adequate mechanism for timely filing.  
14 Defendants do not dispute either of those claims. Rather they assert that some asylum seekers  
15 are provided with such notice and filing opportunities. Accordingly, the Court concludes that  
16 the resolution of the legal issues raised by Plaintiffs will generate one result for each member of  
17 the putative classes and subclasses. Thus, the Court agrees that these legal issues constitute a  
18 “common contention” that is “capable of classwide resolution.” *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 350.  
19  
20  
21

### 22 3. *Typicality*

23 “[R]epresentative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably co-extensive with those of  
24 absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020.  
25 “Typicality refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the  
26 specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought.” *Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp.*, 976 F.2d  
27  
28

1 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the “commonality and typicality requirements of Rule  
2 23(a) tend to merge.” *Falcon*, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13. “Both serve as guideposts for determining  
3 whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and  
4 whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of  
5 the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” *Id.* In determining  
6 typicality, courts consider “whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the  
7 action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class  
8 members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” *Hanon*, 976 F.2d at 508.

9  
10 Plaintiffs convincingly argue that all Individual Plaintiffs suffered the same injury as the  
11 putative class. Dkts. #7 at 20-22 and #30 at 7-10. Defendants primarily respond with the same  
12 arguments regarding injury in fact as have already been rejected by this Court. Dkt. #29 at 10-  
13 13. They are no more persuasive in the context of typicality. Accordingly, the Court concludes  
14 that the individual Plaintiffs are typical of the classes and subclasses they seek to represent.  
15

#### 16 4. Adequacy

17 Defendants have not separately addressed the adequacy requirement. Instead, they  
18 included their objections in their arguments as to typicality. Dkt. #29 at 10-13. For the same  
19 reasons above, the Court concludes that the individual Plaintiffs and their proposed counsel  
20 constitute adequate class representatives.  
21

#### 22 5. Common Grounds

23 Plaintiffs contend that their class action satisfies Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendants have  
24 “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive  
25 relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed.  
26 R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); Dkt. #7 at 23-24. “Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate  
27  
28

1 only where the primary relief sought is declaratory or injunctive.” *Zinser v. Accufix Research*  
2 *Inst., Inc.*, 253 F.3d 1180, 1195 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court treats “[p]redominance and  
3 superiority a[s] self-evident,” *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 363, and requires “[o]nly a showing of  
4 cohesiveness of class claims,” *Herskowitz v. Apple, Inc.*, 301 F.R.D. 460, 481 (N.D. Cal. 2014)  
5 (citing *Fosmire v. Progressive Max Ins. Co.*, 277 F.R.D. 625, 635 (W.D. Wash. 2011)).  
6

7 In this case, the primary relief that Plaintiffs seek is declaratory and injunctive.  
8 Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the DHS Defendants’ policy and practice of failing to give  
9 notice of the one-year deadline is contrary to the statute and the Constitution and that the DHS  
10 and DOJ Defendants’ failure to provide uniform meaningful and reliable mechanisms within  
11 which to comply is contrary to the statute and the Constitution. Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 127-131 and  
12 *Prayer for Relief*, ¶¶ d.-e.  
13

14 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to meet the 23(b)(2) standard because Defendants  
15 have not failed to act or refused to act on grounds applicable to the class. Dkt. #29 at 13-15.  
16 For the reasons set forth by Plaintiffs, the Court does not agree that Defendants have presented  
17 either a system whereby putative class members are guaranteed notice of the one-year filing  
18 deadline or a mechanism whereby putative class members are assured of the opportunity to  
19 timely file their asylum applications. *See* Dkt. #30 at 10-12.  
20

21 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have also met the requirements of Rule  
22 23(b)(2), and their proposed classes and subclasses should be certified.  
23

#### 24 IV. CONCLUSION

25 Having reviewed Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the opposition thereto and  
26 reply in support thereof, along with the Declarations submitted by the parties and the remainder  
27 of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS:  
28

1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. #7) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiffs have satisfied the class certification requirements as discussed above.

Therefore, the following classes and subclasses are CERTIFIED:

a. **CLASS A ("Credible Fear Class"):** All individuals who have been released or will be released from DHS custody after they have been found to have a credible fear of persecution within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).

i) **A.I.:** All individuals in Class A who *are not* in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival.

ii) **A.II.:** All individuals in Class A who *are* in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival.

b. **CLASS B ("Other Entrants Class"):** All individuals who have been or will be detained upon entry; express a fear of return to their country of origin; are released or will be released from DHS custody without a credible fear determination; are issued a Notice to Appear (NTA); and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).

i) **B.I.:** All individuals in Class B who *are not* in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival.

1 ii) **B.II.:** All individuals in Class B who *are* in removal proceedings  
2 and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied  
3 for asylum after one year of their last arrival.

4 3. Plaintiffs' proposed representatives will fairly and adequately protect the class  
5 interests as discussed above. Therefore, the following class representatives are  
6 APPOINTED:  
7

8 a. As Class A representatives: **Plaintiffs Elmer Geovanni Rodriguez Escobar**  
9 **and Concely del Carmen Mendez Rojas.** Plaintiff Rodriguez will also  
10 serve as representative of Subclass A.I., while Plaintiff Mendez will serve as  
11 representative of Subclass A.II.  
12

13 b. As Class B representatives: **Plaintiffs Maribel Suarez Garcia and Lidia**  
14 **Margarita Lopez Orellana.** Plaintiff Lopez will also serve as  
15 representative of Subclass B.I., while Plaintiff Suarez will serve as  
16 representative of Subclass B.II.  
17

18 4. The Court also adopts Plaintiffs' definition of "applied" as defined in footnote 1 of  
19 their motion for class certification (Dkt. #7 at 3, fn. 1).

20 5. Plaintiffs' current counsel will also fairly and adequately protect the class interests  
21 as discussed above.

22 DATED this 10 day of January, 2017.

23  
24  
25 

26 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ  
27 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  
28



# EXHIBIT B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

CONCELY del CARMEN MENDEZ	)	
ROJAS, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	CASE NO. C16-1024 RSM
	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	
	)	ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
v.	)	SUMMARY JUDGMENT
	)	
JEH JOHNSON, Secretary of the	)	
Department of Homeland Security, in his	)	
official capacity, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

**I. INTRODUCTION**

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. #57. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ failure to provide all class members with notice of the one-year asylum application deadline and failure to create and implement procedural mechanisms that guarantee class members the opportunity to timely submit their asylum applications violate the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), governing regulations and due process. *Id.* Plaintiffs assert that based on the record before this Court summary judgment in their favor is appropriate. *Id.* Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that Plaintiffs seek to impute notice requirements that neither Congress nor the U.S. Constitution mandates, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim for new procedural mechanisms. Dkt. #61. For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees with Defendants and now GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion.

## II. BACKGROUND

1  
2 The Plaintiff class members are asylum seekers who challenge Defendants' alleged  
3 failure to provide them with notice of the statutory requirement that an asylum seeker must apply  
4 for asylum within one year of arrival in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), as well as  
5 Defendants' alleged failure to provide a mechanism that ensures that an asylum seeker is able to  
6 comply with that deadline. Dkt. #1. The Court has certified the following classes and subclasses  
7  
8 in this matter:

9 **CLASS A ("Credible Fear Class"):** All individuals who have been released  
10 or will be released from DHS custody after they have been found to have a  
11 credible fear of persecution within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. §  
12 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year  
13 deadline to file an asylum application as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).

14 **A.I.:** All individuals in Class A who *are not* in removal proceedings and who  
15 either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one  
16 year of their last arrival.

17 **A.II.:** All individuals in Class A who *are* in removal proceedings and who  
18 either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one  
19 year of their last arrival.

20 **CLASS B ("Other Entrants Class"):** All individuals who have been or will  
21 be detained upon entry; express a fear of return to their country of origin; are  
22 released or will be released from DHS custody without a credible fear  
23 determination; are issued a Notice to Appear (NTA); and did not receive  
24 notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application set  
25 forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).

26 **B.I.:** All individuals in Class B who *are not* in removal proceedings and who  
27 either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one  
28 year of their last arrival.

**B.II.:** All individuals in Class B who *are* in removal proceedings and who  
either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one  
year of their last arrival.

Dkt. #37.

1 For context, Plaintiffs have provided a brief background of the class representatives,  
2 which is undisputed by Defendants:

3 Plaintiff Rodriguez is a 37-year-old asylum seeker from Honduras. Mr.  
4 Rodriguez entered the United States in July 2014 and established a credible  
5 fear of persecution in an interview with USCIS. Subsequently, DHS released  
6 him from custody with an NTA, the charging document in removal  
7 proceedings, but did not inform him of the one-year deadline. DHS has not  
8 placed Mr. Rodriguez in removal proceedings yet. He only learned of the  
9 deadline when he sought counsel for his immigration case. His attempts to  
10 comply with the one-year deadline have been unsuccessful, however, as both  
11 USCIS and EOIR have rejected his asylum application – USCIS rejected it  
12 on the assumption that Mr. Rodriguez was in removal proceedings, so the  
13 application had to be filed with EOIR; EOIR rejected the application Mr.  
14 Rodriguez attempted to lodge because he is not actually in removal  
15 proceedings. As a result, he has been unable to file, or even lodge, his asylum  
16 application. *See* Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 60-66.

17 Plaintiff Mendez is a 30-year-old asylum seeker from the Dominican  
18 Republic. Ms. Mendez entered the United States in September 2013 and  
19 established a credible fear of persecution in an interview with USCIS.  
20 Subsequently, DHS released her from custody with an NTA, but did not  
21 inform her of the one-year deadline. She only learned of the deadline when  
22 she sought counsel for her immigration case – *after* one year had already  
23 passed. As she had not yet been placed in removal proceedings, Ms. Mendez  
24 attempted to file an asylum application with USCIS, but USCIS rejected it on  
25 the assumption that she already was in removal proceedings. Only after this  
26 rejection – and more than one year after she entered the country – did DHS  
27 file the NTA with the immigration court, allowing Ms. Mendez to finally  
28 lodge her asylum application with the San Antonio Immigration Court. Her  
first immigration court hearing will be in August 2016. *See* Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 67-74.

21 Plaintiff Lopez is a 37-year-old asylum seeker from Guatemala. In February  
22 2014, she arrived at a Texas port of entry with two of her children and told  
23 the inspecting officers that she was afraid to return to Guatemala. DHS  
24 served Ms. Lopez and her children with NTAs and released them from  
25 custody with the requirement that they check in with DHS on a regular basis.  
26 DHS did not inform her of the one-year deadline. Ms. Lopez checked in with  
27 DHS on four occasions between March 2014 and September 2015, yet at no  
28 point did DHS inform her of the one-year deadline. In October 2015, she was  
issued a notice of hearing for November 2015 in the San Antonio  
Immigration Court. Ms. Lopez did not learn of the one-year deadline until  
she consulted an immigration attorney in December 2015. She lodged her  
asylum application with the court in January 2016, nearly two years after she  
arrived in the United States. The immigration judge subsequently terminated

1 her removal proceedings, and she filed an asylum application affirmatively  
2 with USCIS in February 2016. USCIS has not yet scheduled an interview  
regarding her asylum application. *See* Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 75-81.

3 Plaintiff Suarez is a 29-year-old asylum seeker from Mexico. She and her  
4 five young children arrived at a California port of entry in November 2013.  
5 Upon her arrival, Ms. Suarez informed DHS that she was afraid to return to  
6 Mexico and that she was seeking asylum in the United States. She provided  
7 DHS with a sworn statement regarding her fear of returning to Mexico.  
8 Shortly afterwards, DHS released her and her children from custody with  
9 NTAs, and paroled them into the country to await a removal hearing. At no  
10 point did DHS inform Ms. Suarez of the one-year deadline. She first learned  
of this requirement more than a year later, when she sought counsel. She then  
promptly lodged her application with the San Francisco Immigration Court.  
Ms. Suarez is scheduled for an individual hearing in May 2017. *See* Dkt. 1 ¶  
¶ 82-87.

11 Dkt. #7 at 8-10.

12 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' policies and practices infringe on their statutory and  
13 regulatory rights to apply for asylum, often depriving them of those rights altogether, and also  
14 violate their right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
15

### 16 III. DISCUSSION

#### 17 A. Legal Standard

18 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine  
19 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.  
20 R. Civ. P. 56(a); *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Material facts are  
21 those which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at  
22 248. In ruling on summary judgment, a court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth of  
23 the matter, but “only determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” *Crane v. Conoco,*  
24 *Inc.*, 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing *Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Meyers,*  
25 *969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992)*)).  
26  
27  
28

1 On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and draws inferences  
2 in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 255; *Sullivan v. U.S.*  
3 *Dep't of the Navy*, 365 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the nonmoving party must make  
4 a “sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden  
5 of proof” to survive summary judgment. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  
6 Further, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will  
7 be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”  
8 *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 251.

## 10 **B. Notice of One-Year Asylum Application Deadline**

### 11 *1. Alleged Violation of the INA and APA*

12 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), “[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States  
13 or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including  
14 an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or  
15 United States waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum in accordance  
16 with this section. . . .” “The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant  
17 asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the requirements and  
18 procedures established by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General under”  
19 that statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). However, the foregoing “shall not apply to an alien unless  
20 the alien demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed within  
21 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). If an  
22 alien does not apply within one year after arrival in the United States, “the application for asylum  
23 may be considered if the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the  
24 existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application” within the one-year  
2 period. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).

3 Plaintiffs first argue that because the ability to exercise the right to apply for asylum is  
4 contingent upon filing in a timely manner, when Defendants<sup>1</sup> fail to provide notice of the one-  
5 year deadline or delay providing notice, they violate congressional intent, and as a result violate  
6 both the INA and the APA. Dkt. #57 at 8. Defendants acknowledge that they do not provide  
7 blanket notice to all asylum seekers at the time they are apprehended, during the credible fear  
8 determination, or upon release, but respond that no such statutory notice requirement exists. Dkt.  
9 #61 at 4-5. As a result, Defendants assert that they have not violated the law and summary  
10 judgment on this basis must be denied.  
11  
12

13 Plaintiffs have relied on certain congressional history in support of their argument.  
14 Specifically, Plaintiffs point to Senator Orrin Hatch’s comments on the Omnibus Consolidated  
15 Appropriations Act, 1997, which he made on September 30, 1996. Dkt. #57 at 8 (citing 142  
16 CONG. Rec. S11,840 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1996)(statement of Sen. Hatch)). Senator Hatch stated:  
17

18 Like my distinguished colleague from Michigan, I too supported the Senate  
19 provision, which received overwhelming, bipartisan support in the Senate. In  
20 fact, that provision was adopted by an amendment in the Judiciary Committee  
21 that passed by unanimous consent. The Senate provisions had established a  
22 1-year time limit only on defensive claims of asylum, that is, those raised for  
23 the first time in deportation proceedings, and provided for a good cause  
24 exception.

25 Let me say that I share the Senator’s concern that we continue to ensure that  
26 asylum is available for those with legitimate claims of asylum. The way in  
27 which the time limit was rewritten in the conference report--with the two  
28 exceptions specified--was intended to provide adequate protections to those  
with legitimate claims of asylum. I expect that circumstances covered by the

---

1 The Court acknowledges that not every legal argument raised by Plaintiffs applies to each separate Defendant, and that some arguments are directed toward the Agency Defendants, while some are directed at the Individual Defendants. However, for ease of reference, the Court simply refers in its discussion to “Defendants” in the plural, and will differentiate a particular Defendant or group of Defendants if and when it becomes necessary in making specific rulings.

1 Senate's good cause exception will likely be covered by either the changed  
2 circumstances exception or the extraordinary circumstances exception  
3 contained in the conference report language. The conference report provision  
4 represents a compromise in that, unlike the Senate provision, it applies to all  
5 claims of asylum, whether raised affirmatively or defensively.

6 [Question by] Mr. ABRAHAM. Would you say that the intent in the changed  
7 circumstances exception is to cover a broad range of circumstances that may  
8 have changed and that affect the applicant's ability to obtain asylum?

9 Mr. HATCH. Yes. That exception is intended to deal with circumstances  
10 that changed after the applicant entered the United States and that are relevant  
11 to the applicant's eligibility for asylum. The changed circumstances  
12 provision will deal with situations like those in which the situation in the  
13 alien's home country may have changed, the applicant obtains more  
14 information about likely retribution he or she might face if the applicant  
15 returned home, and other situations that we in Congress may not be able to  
16 anticipate at this time.

17 [Question by] Mr. ABRAHAM. It is my understanding that the second  
18 exception, for extraordinary circumstances, relates to legitimate reasons  
19 excusing the alien's failure to meet the 1-year deadline. Is that the case?

20 Mr. HATCH. Yes, the extraordinary circumstances exception applies to  
21 reasons that are, quite literally, out of the ordinary and that explain the alien's  
22 inability to meet the 1-year deadline. Extraordinary circumstances excusing  
23 the delay could include, for instance, physical or mental disability,  
24 unsuccessful efforts to seek asylum that failed due to technical defects or  
25 errors for which the alien was not responsible, and other extenuating  
26 circumstances.

27 [Question by] Mr. ABRAHAM. If the time limit and the exceptions you have  
28 discussed do not provide sufficient protection to aliens with bona fide claims  
of asylum, I will be prepared to work with my colleagues to address that  
problem. Is my understanding correct that you too will pay close attention to  
how this provision is interpreted?

Mr. HATCH. Yes. Like you, I am committed to ensuring that those with  
legitimate claims of asylum are not returned to persecution, particularly for  
technical deficiencies. If the time limit is not implemented fairly, or cannot  
be implemented fairly, I will be prepared to revisit this issue in a later  
Congress. I would also like to let the Senator from Michigan know how much  
I appreciate his commitment and dedication on this issue.



1 142 CONG. Rec. S11,839-840. Plaintiffs argue that by failing to give notice of the one-year  
2 filing period, Defendants effectively reduce that filing period, even though Congress did not  
3 intend for the one-year time period to foreclose legitimate claims. Dkt. #57 at 8. The Court  
4 agrees.

5 In adopting the one-year application period, Senators Hatch and Abraham were  
6 concerned about potential limitations on the rights of applicants with legitimate claims. Indeed,  
7 Senator Hatch recognized that the Senate had initially adopted a provision with an application  
8 time limit for only those applicants raising a defensive claim of asylum – that is, for applicants  
9 raising asylum as a defense to removal, rather than those applicants affirmatively seeking asylum  
10 upon entry into this country. *See supra*. Senator Hatch then explained that the two exceptions  
11 later added were intended to cover a range of changed or extraordinary circumstances to assist  
12 those applicants with legitimate claims of asylum with making their applications. *Id.* However,  
13 to address congressional concerns, Senator Hatch specifically stated that he would be watching  
14 how the one-year time limit was being implemented to make sure it was “implemented fairly.”  
15 *Id.* As demonstrated by Plaintiffs, and more fully discussed below in the context of due process,  
16 the failure to provide all class members with notice of the one-year application period violates  
17 the intent to ensure that asylum is available for those with legitimate claims of asylum. This is  
18 particularly true where unsuccessful efforts to seek asylum have failed due to technical defects,  
19 which the adopted exceptions were specifically designed to prevent. Accordingly, the Court  
20 agrees that the failure to provide notice of the one-year application period violates congressional  
21 intent.  
22  
23  
24  
25

26 ///

27 ///

2. *Alleged Violation of 5<sup>th</sup> Amendment Due Process Clause*

1  
2 Plaintiffs next argue that Defendants' failure to provide adequate notice of the one-year  
3 application time limit violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Dkt. #57 at 8-15.  
4 Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants do not provide notice that is reasonably calculated  
5 to timely convey information about the deadline, and that the failure to provide notice violates  
6 procedural due process rights. *Id.* Defendants respond that they do provide notice of the time  
7 limit and that Plaintiffs do not use the correct standard with respect to the procedural due process  
8 claim. Dkt. #61 at 6-15. Defendants also believe that *Mullane* rather than *Mathews v. Eldridge*  
9 governs all parts of Plaintiffs' due process claim.  
10

11 In *Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 336, 70 S. Ct. 652, 95 L. Ed.  
12 865 (1950), the United States Supreme Court examined the constitutional sufficiency of notice.  
13 The Court explained:  
14

15 An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any  
16 proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,  
17 under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of  
18 the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.  
19 *Milliken v. Meyer*, 311 U.S. 457; *Grannis v. Ordean*, 234 U.S. 385; *Priest v.*  
20 *Las Vegas*, 232 U.S. 604; *Roller v. Holly*, 176 U.S. 398. The notice must be  
21 of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, *Grannis v.*  
22 *Ordean*, *supra*, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to  
23 make their appearance, *Roller v. Holly*, *supra*, and *cf. Goodrich v. Ferris*,  
24 214 U.S. 71. But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of  
the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements  
are satisfied. "The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury but  
the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the  
subject with which the statute deals." *American Land Co. v. Zeiss*, 219 U.S.  
47, 67; and see *Blinn v. Nelson*, 222 U.S. 1, 7.

25 But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due  
26 process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually  
27 informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The  
28 reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method  
may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform  
those affected, compare *Hess v. Pawloski*, 274 U.S. 352, with *Wuchter v.*

1 *Pizzutti*, 276 U.S. 13, or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such  
2 notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home  
notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.

3 *Mullane*, 339 U.S. at 314-15. Relying on *Mullane*, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' failure to  
4 affirmatively require officials to provide any notice of the one-year deadline is a policy that is  
5 not "reasonably calculated" to provide notice to the class members. Dkt. #57 at 9.

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7 Defendants respond that while they are admittedly not required to provide any notice to  
8 class members, they actually do provide notice. Dkt. #61 at 6. They point to the Information  
9 Guide for Prospective Asylum Applicants, Form I-589 and its Instructions, self-help materials  
10 provided by officials to detainees and the Know Your Rights video shown to many detainees.  
11 Dkt. #61 at 6-7. Defendants note that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that publicly  
12 available documents can provide sufficient notice. *Id.* at 7-10.

13  
14 However, Defendants fail to address Plaintiffs' argument that while courts make such  
15 recognition, public notice is not always sufficient. Both the Ninth Circuit and other circuits have  
16 recognized that whether affirmative notice beyond publicly-available documents is necessary is  
17 dependent on the circumstances of the case. *See, e.g., Martinez-De Bjorquez v. Ashcroft*, 365  
18 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the *Mullane* standard, notice must be "reasonably calculated,  
19 under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford  
20 them an opportunity to present their objections." 393 U.S. at 314, 70 S. Ct. at 657. "The right  
21 to be heard has little reality or worth unless one . . . can choose for himself whether to appear or  
22 default, acquiesce or contest." *Id.*; *see also City of West Covina v. Perkins*, 525 U.S. 234, 240,  
23 119 S. Ct. 674, 142 L. Ed.2d636 (1999) (citing *Mullane* for this proposition). In determining  
24 whether the asylum statute apprises the class members of their right to file an asylum application  
25 so long as it is within one year of their arrival in the United States, the Court recognizes that the  
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1 class members lose the right to make such an application outside of that time period unless, at  
2 the sole discretion of an administrative law or other judge, an exception is made. Thus, for a  
3 notice to be reasonably calculated to apprise class members of the time limit, as *Mullane* requires,  
4 the notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise Class A members of this right upon a credible  
5 fear determination, and Class B members when they express a fear of returning to their country,  
6 but are released or will be released without a credible fear determination and are instead issued  
7 a Notice to Appear. Moreover, as demonstrated by the record in this matter, given the lengthy  
8 delays inherent in this country's immigration system, the Court assumes that if the class members  
9 are unaware of the one-year time limit, there is a substantial likelihood that they will not file their  
10 applications on time. Thus, under the *Mullane* standard, the Court must consider whether the  
11 documents relied upon by Defendants are reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances  
12 of this case, to provide class members of the one-year deadline. The Court finds that they do not.

15 First, the Court concludes that the statute alone is not reasonably calculated to apprise the  
16 tenants of the one-year time period. In considering all of the circumstances of this case, it is  
17 important to recognize the limitations of the persons seeking asylum. As Plaintiffs note, many  
18 class members have suffered severe trauma, do not speak English, are unfamiliar with the United  
19 States' complicated immigration legal system, and do not have access to counsel. *See* Dkt. #57  
20 at 11. The Court agrees that these vulnerabilities are compounded by the notices that are provided  
21 to class members, that notify them they are able to seek relief from removal by appearing before  
22 an Immigration Judge, but do not mention the one-year deadline for filing an application for  
23 asylum. *Id.*

1 In *Grayden v. Rhodes*, 345 F.3d 1225 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003), the Eleventh Circuit Court of  
2 Appeals addressed an analogous situation. In that case, the Court examined whether evicted  
3 tenants had adequate notice of remedies available to them under City code. The Court explained:

4 Although the Orlando City Code is a publicly available document and the law  
5 presumptively charged the evicted tenants of Lafayette Square with  
6 knowledge of its provisions, the law does not presume that the tenants  
7 *actually knew* of their right to challenge the condemnation when they  
8 received the notice to vacate on June 29 and 30. The law does not entertain  
9 the legal fiction that every individual has achieved a state of legal  
10 omniscience; in other words, there is no presumption that all of the citizens  
11 actually know all of the law all of the time. Practically speaking, citizens  
12 must educate themselves about the law before they can wield the rights  
13 dedicated to them under it, and the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory  
14 notice takes account of this reality. *See West Covina*, 525 U.S. at 241, 119 S.  
15 Ct. at 682 (noting that an individual “can turn to these public sources to learn  
16 about the remedial procedures available to him”); *id.* at 242, 119 S. Ct. at 682  
17 (noting that a citizen “could not reasonably be expected to educate himself  
18 about the procedures available to protect his interests”); *United States v.*  
19 *Locke*, 471 U.S. 84, 108, 105 S. Ct. 1785, 1799-1800, 85 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1985)  
20 (noting that citizens need “a reasonable opportunity . . . to familiarize  
21 themselves with the general requirements imposed” by a new law); *Atkins v.*  
22 *Parker*, 472 U.S. 115, 130, 105 S. Ct. 2520, 2529, 86 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1985)  
23 (noting that the presumption that all citizens are charged with knowledge of  
24 the law arguably may be overcome in cases in which the statute “does not  
25 allow a sufficient ‘grace period’ to provide the persons affected by a change  
26 in the law with an adequate opportunity to become familiar with their  
27 obligations under it”); *Texaco, Inc. v. Short*, 454 U.S. 516, 532, 102 S. Ct.  
28 781, 793, 70 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1982) (“Generally, a legislature need do nothing  
more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable  
opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply.”). We  
conclude, in the circumstances of this case, that § 30A.11 of the Orlando City  
Code was not reasonably calculated to inform the tenants of Lafayette Square,  
who faced the burdens associated with an eviction and had less than thirty-  
six hours to vacate their homes, of their right to choose between acquiescing  
in or contesting Rhodes’ condemnation order.

24 *Grayden*, 345 F.3d at 1242-43. Central to the Court’s analysis was the fact that the evicted  
25 tenants had little time to accomplish numerous complicated tasks. *Id.* The Court finds this  
26 reasoning persuasive in this case.  
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1 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that notice which is “confusing” and  
2 “affirmatively misleading” is not sufficient to satisfy due process. *Walters v. Reno*, 145 F.3d  
3 1032, 1043 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (holding that a form lacking relevant information “lulls the  
4 [noncitizen] into a false sense of procedural security”); *see also United States v. Charleswell*,  
5 456 F.3d 347, 356-57 (3rd Cir. 2006) (in a situation involving a misleading form, finding that “it  
6 is simply unrealistic to expect [a noncitizen] to recognize, understand and pursue his statutory  
7 right” to judicial review absent additional notice); *United States v. Montero*, No. CR-12-0095  
8 EMC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134941 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2012) (“When ‘the combined effect of  
9 all the forms together is confusion,’ notice to the immigrant is constitutionally deficient.”)  
10 (quoting *Walters*).

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13 The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that class members face just such a situation in this case.  
14 *See* Dkt. #62 at 5-6. By definition, they have all asserted the desire to apply for asylum, but were  
15 not provided asylum applications or notice of the one-year deadline. Instead, Defendants provide  
16 class members with a variety of documents, some stating that once they appear in court they will  
17 be provided with any necessary information about and/or the opportunity to seek relief from  
18 removal. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. #58-1, Exs. N and O. In addition, Class A members may reasonably  
19 believe they have *already* applied for asylum in their credible fear interviews. *See, e.g.*, Dkts.  
20 #15 at ¶ 8 (“[S]everal of my clients have told me that they believed they had applied for asylum  
21 by passing the credible fear interview because during that process they told an asylum officer in  
22 detail about their asylum claim. . . . They are surprised when I tell them that they need to  
23 complete another application for asylum in writing.”); #16 at ¶ 7 (“[S]ome of these individuals  
24 think that because they have a received a positive credible fear determination, they have been  
25 granted asylum.”); and #19 at ¶ 9 (“Many of the individuals released from DHS custody are under  
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1 the assumption that they have *already applied* for asylum”). The Court agrees with Plaintiffs  
2 that such confusion is further compounded because class members are especially vulnerable. *See*  
3 Dkt. #57 at 10-12. Thus, class members are reasonably unaware that they should seek out  
4 information about any possible deadline.

5 The Court further agrees that other types of notice which Defendants provide to class  
6 members does not meet their obligations under the due process clause. As noted above,  
7 Defendants must provide notice that “afford[s] a reasonable time for those interested to make  
8 their appearance.” *Mullane*, 339 U.S. at 314 (citations omitted). Notice provided through  
9 immigration court hearings, which may be scheduled only after the one-year deadline has already  
10 elapsed, is not provided at a reasonable time. *See* Dkt. #57 at 19 (discussing cases in which a  
11 Notice to Appear (NTA) is not filed with an immigration court until more than a year after entry).  
12 Likewise, other forms of notice that Defendants may provide earlier in the process are insufficient  
13 because they are not provided to all class members. *See Walters*, 145 F.3d at 1045 (requiring  
14 provision of additional notice even though some individuals “may have received adequate notice  
15 in spite of the constitutionally deficient official procedures”). Defendants admit that they have  
16 no policy requiring uniform provision of such notice.  
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20 For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Agency Defendants do not provide  
21 sufficient notice of the one-year deadline to satisfy the Due Process clause. Because Defendant  
22 agrees that the applicable standard is set forth under *Mullane, supra*, there is no need for this  
23 Court to address similar arguments set forth by Plaintiffs under *Mathews v. Eldridge*. *See* Dkt.  
24 #57 at 12-15.  
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### C. Meaningful Application Mechanisms

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2 The Court next turns to Plaintiffs' arguments that Defendants' failure to provide a  
3 uniform mechanism to timely file their asylum applications violates the asylum statute and the  
4 APA, and that it violates due process. Dkt. #57 at 15-24. Plaintiffs first assert that even if class  
5 members become aware of the one-year filing period, Defendants have created a system that  
6 makes it virtually impossible to timely file for asylum. Dkt. #57 at 15-22. Plaintiffs further assert  
7 that the Department of Homeland Security refuses to accept asylum applications filed by class  
8 members on the basis that jurisdiction to adjudicate those applications is going to, at some point  
9 in the future, vest with the immigration court; but, at the same time, an immigration court will  
10 not accept an application until, at a very minimum, an NTA has been filed with that court. Dkt.  
11 #57 at 15. Plaintiffs note that in some cases, an NTA is not filed until the class member has been  
12 in the United States for more than a year. *Id.* "Where the immigration court does not promptly  
13 process the NTA, and the filing deadline passes, there is no venue for class members to file their  
14 asylum applications and, thus, Defendants violate class members' statutory right to apply for  
15 asylum." *Id.* at 16.

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19 Defendants respond in a footnote, that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this claim. Dkt.  
20 #61 at 16, fn. 17. The Court has already twice rejected this argument, and will not further address  
21 it here. *See* Dkts. #37 at 9 and #41 at 3-4.

22  
23 Defendants next argue that the data upon which Plaintiffs rely is outdated and/or does not  
24 demonstrate that class members are denied a mechanism to timely file their applications. Dkt.  
25 #61 at 16-21. Defendants further argue that this Court must give deference to the procedures in  
26 place. *Id.* at 17-18. The Court is not persuaded. First, the undisputed facts demonstrate delays  
27 of more than a year. Indeed, the record evidences more than isolated delays in immigration courts  
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1 from Los Angeles to Boston to San Francisco and Cleveland. Dkts. #31 at ¶¶ 4-5, #32 at ¶¶ 4  
2 and 7, #33 at ¶¶ 6 and 13 and #34 at ¶ 5. Defendants argue that evidence of delays in the Los  
3 Angeles Immigration Court in 2015 and 2016 is “dated,” Dkt. #61 at 17; however, these delays  
4 occurred only a few months before this lawsuit was filed. Other evidence demonstrates that  
5 similar delays have continued into this year. Dkt. #58, Exs. P, U, W, X, Y and Z. *See also* Dkts.  
6 #14 at ¶ 11 and #15 at ¶ 11. Furthermore, Defendants admit that there is no “temporal deadline  
7 on ICE’s filing of an NTA with the immigration court or EOIR’s entry of a filed NTA into its  
8 systems.” Dkt. #61 at 20.

9  
10 Defendants next argue that “the Court must afford deference to that procedure.” Dkt.  
11 #61. However, no deference is owed to procedures that violate a statute or the Constitution. *See*  
12 *Schneider v. Chertoff*, 450 F.3d 944, 952 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e must reject those [agency]  
13 constructions that are contrary to clear congressional intent or that frustrate the policy that  
14 Congress sought to implement.”) (citing *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 843  
15 n.9 (1984)). As noted above, denying class members the opportunity to timely file their asylum  
16 application violates their statutory right to apply for asylum under the INA. Likewise, the refusal  
17 to accept Class B asylum applications is inconsistent with the plain language of 8 C.F.R. §  
18 208.2(a), stating that the USCIS “shall have initial jurisdiction” over such applications. The  
19 Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendants’ efforts to contract their own jurisdiction violates  
20 “[t]he general rule” that “administrative agencies directed by Congress to adjudicate particular  
21 controversies” “may not decline to exercise” this authority. *See Union Pacific R.R. v.*  
22 *Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 558 U.S. 67, 71 (2009).

23  
24 For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants have left class members without an  
25 adequate mechanism to timely file their asylum applications, thereby denying them the  
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1 opportunity to exercise their statutory right to apply for asylum. Thus, they are afforded relief  
2 under the APA. Because the Court finds relief appropriate on this basis, it declines to address  
3 Plaintiffs' argument pertaining to due process. *See* Dkt. #57 at 22-24.

4 **IV. CONCLUSION**

5 Having reviewed Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the opposition thereto and  
6 reply in support thereof, along with the Declarations and Exhibits submitted by the parties and  
7 the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS:  
8

- 9 1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #57) is GRANTED as set forth  
10 above.  
11 2. Within 90 days of this Order, DHS Defendants SHALL ADOPT a notice of the one-  
12 year filing deadline, in consultation with class members, and to thereafter provide this  
13 notice to all class members who have already been released. For all future class  
14 members who have not been released, DHS Defendants SHALL provide this notice  
15 prior to or at the time that these individuals are released from custody.  
16 3. Defendants are ordered to accept as timely filed any asylum application from a class  
17 member that is filed within one year of the date of adoption of the notice described in  
18 paragraph 2.  
19 4. Within 120 days of this Order, all Defendants SHALL ADOPT and publicize, in  
20 consultation with class members, uniform procedural mechanisms that will ensure  
21 that class members are able to file their asylum applications in a timely manner, and  
22 to thereafter immediately implement this procedure.  
23 5. This case is now CLOSED.  
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DATED this 29<sup>th</sup> day of March 2018.



RICARDO S. MARTINEZ  
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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