Introduction

This advisory discusses the so-called “departure bar” regulations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), and 1003.23(b)(1). Relying on these regulations, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) and the Immigration Courts have refused to adjudicate motions filed by individuals who have departed the United States. This advisory addresses the legal background of the departure bar and the arguments adopted by circuit courts that have rejected or upheld the bar.

The advisory also addresses two issues related to the departure bar and litigation for those who have departed: (1) the departure bar regulation governing departure during the pendency of a BIA appeal, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4, and (2) returning to the United States after a post departure motion (or appeal) is granted.

Background

Dating back to 1952, the immigration regulations have included a “departure bar” – a provision that attempts to bar a person from pursuing a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider after he or she has departed the United States. The current regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d) and 1003.23(b)(1), bar motions before the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Courts, respectively. Specifically, the regulations provide:

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2. The Post-Deportation Human Rights Clinic at Boston College also has issued an advisory, Post-Departure Motions to Reopen or Reconsider, that provides background on the different types of motions and discusses the BIA and circuit court case law on the departure bar.
A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States. Any departure from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). See also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).

From the outset, the BIA has understood the departure bar as a limitation on its jurisdiction. See Matter of G- y B-, 6 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1954). In a 2008 decision, the BIA upheld the departure bar regulation and reaffirmed its belief that it lacks jurisdiction over motions post departure. See Matter of Armendarez, 24 I&N Dec. 646 (BIA 2008). The following year, the BIA stepped back from this position and concluded that immigration judges have jurisdiction to review certain motions filed by individuals outside the United States. See Matter of Buhres, 25 I&N Dec. 57, 58-60 (BIA 2009). Specifically, it held that the departure bar does not preclude an immigration judge from adjudicating a motion to reopen an in absentia order based on lack of notice. See id.; see also Contreras-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) (reaching same conclusion).

Importantly, when the BIA first adopted the departure bar, motions to reopen and reconsider were regulatory procedures. Not until 1996 did Congress codify the right to file a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, § 304 (Sept. 30, 1996); see also Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 14 (2008) (“It must be noted, though, that the Act transforms the motion to reopen from a regulatory procedure to a statutory form of relief available to the alien”).

Beginning in 2007, ten circuit courts have found that the departure bar is unlawful. In all ten cases, the courts considered the validity of the departure bar with respect to a statutory motion to reopen or reconsider, meaning a motion filed pursuant to the statutory right to file a motion to reopen or reconsider under INA §§ 240(c)(6) or (7). Only the Eighth Circuit has yet to rule on this issue. In contrast, as discussed below, some courts have considered and upheld the departure bar with respect to sua sponte motions, i.e., motions filed pursuant to the agency’s regulatory authority to reopen or reconsider a case at any time. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.23(b)(1) and 1003.2(a).

Bases for Invalidating the Post Departure Regulation

Courts striking the departure bar regulation have concluded that the regulation either: (1) conflicts with the motion to reopen statute; or (2) constitutes an impermissible exercise of the agency’s jurisdiction. In finding that the regulation conflicts with the motion statute, seven courts have applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which generally governs challenges to
the validity of an agency regulation. *Perez Santana v. Holder*, 731 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2013); *Prestol Espinal v. AG of the United States*, 653 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2011); *William v. Gonzales*, 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007); *Carias v. Holder*, 697 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2012); *Coyt v. Holder*, 593 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2010); *Reyes-Torres v. Holder*, 645 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2011); *Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder*, 678 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc); *Jian Le Lin v. United States AG*, 681 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012). These courts have found that the departure bar regulation conflicts with the plain language of the motion statute, which contains no such bar, and that application of statutory construction rules reinforces this plain text reading. These courts also have relied on the Supreme Court’s construction of the motion to reopen statute in *Dada v. Mukasey*, 554 U.S. 1 (2008), and reaffirmed in *Kucana v. Holder*, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010). In *Dada*, the Supreme Court noted that in IIRIRA, Congress took the significant step of codifying the motion to reopen. *Dada*, 554 U.S. at 14. Further, the Supreme Court held that the government may not infringe on the “important safeguard” of a motion to reopen absent explicit limiting language in the statute. *Dada*, 554 U.S. at 18.

Three courts of appeals have taken a different approach, concluding that the Board’s refusal to exercise its congressionally-delegated jurisdiction conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Union Pacific R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009). *Luna v. Holder*, 637 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011); *Pruidze v. Holder*, 632 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2011); *Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder*, 612 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2010). These courts have reasoned that Congress delegated the authority to adjudicate all motions to immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals and that, therefore, the agency cannot refuse to adjudicate a subset of motions (i.e., post departure motions) on jurisdictional grounds.

Practitioners with cases in the Eighth Circuit – the only court of appeals that has yet to rule on the validity of the departure bar with respect to a statutory motion – are encouraged to contact the authors of this advisory at clearinghouse@immcouncil.org.

**Sua Sponte Reopening or Reconsideration and Motions Filed After 90/30 Days from the Removal Order**

The cases finding the departure bar unlawful, discussed above, all arose in the context of motions to reopen or reconsider filed pursuant to the motion statutes, INA §§ 240(c)(6) and (7), and the courts relied upon these statutory provisions in their analyses. Many motions to reopen or reconsider, however, are filed after the expiration of the 90 day deadline for motions to reopen, INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i), or the 30 day deadline for motions to reconsider, INA § 240(c)(6)(B). These motions ask that the immigration judge or the BIA exercise sua sponte authority to reopen or reconsider a decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.23(b)(1) or 1003.2(a), respectively. Three circuit courts have found that the departure bar is lawful with respect to sua sponte motions. *Zhang v. Holder*, 617 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 2010); *Desai v. AG of the United States*, 695 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2012); *Ovalles v. Holder*, 577 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2009). However, these courts did not address all the potential arguments against application of the departure bar to a sua sponte motion, which may vary depending on the underlying basis of the motion. Thus, other
courts, and even other panels within these circuits, could find that the departure bar may not apply to a sua sponte motion.

The Ninth Circuit is the only court to indicate that the departure bar is not lawful based on reasoning that applies regardless whether the motion is filed pursuant to the motion statute or the sua sponte regulation. In Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007), and Reynoso-Cisneros v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2007), the court interpreted the departure bar regulation as applicable only where a person filed the motion while still in proceedings (i.e., before he or she departed) and not when the motion is filed after the departure. However, subsequent to Lin and Reynoso-Cisneros, the Board issued Matter of Armendarez, in which it rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and said that it would decline to follow these decisions even in the Ninth Circuit. Matter of Armendarez, 24 I&N Dec. at 653 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)). The Ninth Circuit has yet to revisit Lin and Reynoso-Cisneros in a published decision following Matter of Armendarez.

Importantly, given the three adverse decisions and the uncertain future of Lin and Reynoso-Cisneros, individuals who are outside the 90 or 30 day filing windows, should explore all arguments that the motion falls within the statutory provisions, even if it is filed after 90 (or 30) days. For example, there are several exceptions to the filing deadline, including motions seeking to reopen and rescind an in absentia removal order, INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(iii), and motions seeking reopening to apply for asylum, INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii). Furthermore, most courts also recognize that the filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling. If equitable tolling applies, “the motion is treated as if it were the one the [person] is statutorily entitled to file.” Singh v. Holder, 658 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2011). In this situation, individuals may wish to seek sua sponte reopening in the alternative, i.e. if the immigration judge or BIA rejects the argument that the motion is statutory.

3 See Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2000); Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398 (3d Cir. 2005); Kiusk v. Holder, 732 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2013); Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2004); Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2005); Ortega-Marroquin v. Holder, 640 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2011); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2002); Avila-Santoyo v. AG, 713 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc).

The First Circuit has yet to rule on this issue, though it recently has found it “notable” that “every circuit that has addressed the issue thus far has held that equitable tolling applies to either or both the time and numerical limits to filing motions to reopen.” Bolieiro v. Holder, 731 F.3d 32, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19873, *19 n.7 (1st Cir. 2013). The only other circuit that has yet to recognize equitable tolling is the Fifth Circuit. Rather, that court has said that requests for equitable tolling are essentially requests for sua sponte reopening, and thus the court lacks jurisdiction over such requests. See Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 2008). Practitioners with cases raising equitable tolling in the Fifth Circuit are encouraged to contact the authors of this advisory at clearinghouse@immcouncil.org.
Inapplicability of the Departure Bar Where the Basis of the Underlying Conviction is Vacated

Prior to finding the departure bar unlawful, the Ninth Circuit held that the departure bar does not apply where the underlying removal order was not “legally executed.” See Estrada-Rosales v. INS, 645 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1981). The court said that a removal order is not legally executed where a criminal court subsequently vacates a conviction that constituted a “key part” of the order. See id.; Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2006); Wiedersperg v. INS, 896 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1990). Significantly, the BIA has established a practice (in the context of motions filed prior to removal) of reopening cases where the conviction forming the basis for removal is vacated, even if the motion is filed after 90 days of the removal order. See Cruz v. AG, 452 F.3d 240, 246 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2006).

Although no other courts have addressed the application of the departure bar to motions to reopen where the underlying removal was not “legally executed,” several courts have considered a related issue: whether the pre-IIRIRA departure bar to judicial review (see former INA § 106(c), repealed by IIRIRA § 306(b)) applied where the deportation was not “legally executed.” Three courts indicated that § 106(c) did not apply in this context while three courts suggested otherwise. See Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977); Juarez v. INS, 732 F.2d 58, 59-60 (6th Cir. 1984); Newton v. INS, 622 F.2d 1193, 1195 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Mendez with approval). But see Quezada v. INS, 898 F.2d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting Mendez); Baez v. INS, 41 F.3d 19, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1994) (same); Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 90 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); Saadi v. INS, 912 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1990).

Related Issues:

Departure Bar to BIA Appeals

In addition to motions to reopen and motions to reconsider, the immigration regulations also attempt to bar individuals from pursuing an administrative appeal with the BIA after departing the United States. By regulation, “departure from the United States . . . prior to the taking of an appeal from a decision in his or her case, shall constitute a waiver of his or her right to appeal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e). Further:

Departure from the United States . . . subsequent to the taking of an appeal, but prior to a decision thereon, shall constitute a withdrawal of the appeal, and the initial decision in the case shall be final to the same extent as though no appeal had been taken.


DHS generally cannot execute a removal order during the thirty day period to file a BIA appeal and during the pendency of the appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a). However, there are
instances where DHS unlawfully deports a person during these time periods. If DHS unlawfully deports a person, § 1003.4 does not apply. Matter of Diaz-Garcia, 25 I&N Dec. 794, 796 (BIA 2012). In addition, DHS may deport a person (lawfully) while he or she is appealing an immigration judge’s denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(b). In these situations, the Board generally applies the departure bar to conclude that it lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to consider the applicability of the bar where DHS deports a person, and has reversed the Board. See Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d 239 (6th Cir. 2009). The court found that to allow the government to cut off the right to appeal by deporting a person would be a “perversion of the administrative process.” Id. at 245.

Other courts have found the regulation lawful and applied it in other situations where the person was not physically deported by DHS. See Long v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying departure bar where petitioner unwittingly left the United States when on a sightseeing trip); Aguilera-Ruiz v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying departure bar to “brief, casual, and innocent” departures); but see Martinez-De Bojorquez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding due process violation where person not given notice of the departure bar). However, no court has considered the Board’s characterization of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.3(e) and 1003.4 as jurisdictional and assessed whether such characterization conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Union Pacific R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009).

Returning to the United States after the BIA or IJ Grants a Post Departure Motion

In circuits where the departure bar is invalid, individuals outside the United States who have prevailed on a post departure motion still may face legal and practical obstacles to pursuing their immigration cases. Unfortunately, the government lacks an adequate policy for return to the United States. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see the practice advisory, Return to the United States After Prevailing on a Petition for Review or Motion to Reopen or Reconsider, available on the websites of the American Immigration Council and the National Immigration Project. Practitioners facing problems with return also may email trina@nipnlg.org or clearinghouse@immcouncil.org to discuss return strategy.

In addition, practitioners may wish to raise the concern with the adequacy of the return policy in stay applications as a factor contributing to the irreparable harm a person will suffer if removed. For a further explanation of this issue, see the practice advisory, Seeking a Judicial Stay of Removal in the Court of Appeals: Standard, Implications of ICE’s Return Policy and the OSG’s Misrepresentation to the Supreme Court, and Smale Stay Motion (May 25, 2012), also available on the websites of the American Immigration Council and National Immigration Project.